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Abstract 
 
We use the largest cross-country sample of reported share transactions by corporate 
insiders to date to establish that insiders in the majority of European countries do not 
make statistically significant abnormal trading profits. This finding stands in contrast 
to the earlier evidence from the U.S. The result holds across subsamples of firms with 
different characteristics. Furthermore, the introduction of the European Union Market 
Abuse Directive (MAD) had a mixed impact on the frequency and volume of insider 
trading across countries but generally did not affect profits of insider-mimicking 
portfolios. We build on the heterogeneity of our sample countries to show that several 
country-level regulatory, economic and cultural factors are linked with the level of 
insider profits which can explain why the profitability of insider trading differs starkly 
across countries. 
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1. Introduction 
There is major controversy around profits corporate insiders can make from trading in 
their firms’ shares. By the nature of their jobs, insiders have privileged access to non-public 
information and, if they use that information in trading, they are likely to benefit at the 
expense of uninformed outside investors. While some argue that profits from insider trading 
are a form of compensation for managers (Manne, 1966; Carlton and Fischel, 1983) and that 
insider trading can bring potential welfare benefits for the whole society from more 
informationally efficient stock pricing (Manne, 1966; Leland, 1992), others point to flawed 
incentives insider trading creates and to a negative impact of insider profits on outside 
investors (e.g., Ausubel, 1990; Leland, 1992; Fried, 1998; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). 
Regulators around the world focus on the harmful adverse selection effects of insider trading 
and take a clear stance by prohibiting trading on the basis of material nonpublic information, 
aiming to curb trading profits insiders can obtain. In this paper we use a data set of reported 
share transactions by corporate insiders in 18 European countries covering up to 14 years, the 
largest cross-country sample to date, to provide the first thorough exploratory analysis of the 
performance of insider-mimicking portfolios in Europe. We find that insiders in many 
countries across Europe, and particularly continental Europe, do not earn abnormal profits 
from their trades. 
This paper closely follows the setup in Jeng et al. (2003) who study profitability of 
corporate insider trading in the U.S. They find that a portfolio mimicking insider purchase 
transactions outperforms the CAPM model by 68 basis points and the four-factor model by 
52 basis points per month (more than 8 and 6 per cent per year, respectively), while the sale 
portfolio does not earn significant abnormal returns. Data on insider transactions across 
Europe became available only recently, with many countries introducing mandatory reporting 
of trades by corporate insiders throughout the 2000s. Our aim, hence, is to apply the 
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methodology in Jeng et al. (2003) to new European data to provide a unified picture of 
insider trading profitability across Europe, compare it with the U.S. evidence in Jeng et al. 
(2003) and shed more light on the question of whether country-level factors determine the 
profitability of insider trades.
1
 
Following the approach in Jeng et al. (2003), we analyze purchase portfolios that 
consist of all shares bought by insiders in a given country and held over a specific period of 
time, and sale portfolios that consist of all shares sold. We then estimate whether such 
mimicking portfolios outperform the respective market on the risk-adjusted basis. As noted 
by Jeng et al. (2003), it is impossible to determine actual insider trading profits because 
information on stock holding periods is incomplete. For example, there is no information on 
an individual’s trades before she becomes an insider (i.e., takes a position in the firm which 
requires reporting of trades under insider trading rules) or after she ceases being an insider. 
Hence, it is impossible to determine when all individual stock positions are opened or closed. 
Additionally, information on shares acquired in an equity-based compensation scheme over 
the individual’s career can be imperfect or incomplete.  Because of these data limitations, one 
has to rely on a proxy for insider returns based on an assumption about the holding period; 
hence, this approach measures realizable and not actual returns. Jeng et al. (2003) assume a 
six-month holding period consistent with the short swing trading rule in the U.S. that 
effectively bans round-trip share transactions by corporate insiders in a period shorter than 
six months. Because to the best of our knowledge there is no equivalent of the short-swing 
trading rule in Europe, we choose different holding periods and look at horizons of 1, 3, 6 and 
12 months. 
Our results can be summarized as follows. We find that insider portfolios generate 
significant risk-adjusted abnormal returns, α’s, in only few European countries. For both 
                                                          
1
 In a related study, Eckbo and Smith (1998) apply an alternative time-varying expected return framework to 
analyze insider portfolios in Norway and fail to find any abnormal performance. 
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purchases and sales we find evidence of the average profitability decreasing with the holding 
horizon, indicating the short-lived nature of insider information advantage. The results are 
similar across sub-samples of firms with specific characteristics related to transparency (size, 
analyst coverage and industry classification and ownership structure), indicating that there is 
no group of firms in which insider trading is consistently profitable. We also find that the 
introduction of the European Union Market Abuse Directive (MAD) into local laws changed 
insiders’ trading patterns, with a mixed picture across countries: insiders post-MAD trade 
more frequently but in lower quantities or trade with the same frequency but in larger 
quantities per trade, but overall the introduction of the MAD had no systematic significant 
effect on returns generated by insider portfolios.  
Differences in insider trading profitability between our sample countries and also the 
stark contrast between the, on average, low profitability in Europe compared to the U.S. 
indicate that structural differences between countries can affect insider profits. In an attempt 
to shed light on those differences we run further cross-sectional tests in which we regress α’s 
to insider portfolios in individual countries on a number of regulatory, economic and cultural 
country-level factors. We find some evidence that insider trading profits are linked with the 
overall investor protection, trading costs, religiosity, trade reporting deadlines and the 
strictness and enforcement of insider trading rules in the country. Specifically, we find that 
insider buying is more profitable in countries with stronger investor protection, in less 
religious countries and when trade reporting deadlines are longer, and the profitability is also 
positively linked with trading costs. For sale transactions, our results indicate that insider 
trading is less profitable in countries with more stringent and better enforced MAD rules. 
Overall, our findings of the importance of country-level factors for insider profits potentially 
explain why the profitability of insider trading is likely to differ significantly across 
countries. 
5 
 
This study complements papers that analyze abnormal stock returns following insider 
transactions using the event-study methodology in individual countries (e.g. Friederich et al., 
2002; Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Betzer and Theissen, 2009; Ravina and Sapienza, 2010; Gregory 
et al., 2013) or in multi-country samples (Ausenegg and Ranzi, 2008; Dardas and Guettler, 
2011; Fidrmuc et al., 2013). As noted by Jeng et al. (2003), the event study methodology is 
best-suited to answer a question of how informative insider trades are for future returns but it 
fails to address a complementary question of returns earned by corporate insiders from 
trading. Towards that end, the approach applied in this paper to analyze portfolios mimicking 
all insider transactions in a country over time has several advantages. It implicitly accounts 
for the transaction volume and, hence, is closer in reflecting the actual insider portfolio as 
opposed to equal weighting of transactions in event studies. It is also focused on observing a 
time series of insider portfolio composition and performance, including a sequence of trades 
within a company and across companies, as opposed to the cross-sectional approach in event 
studies. Therefore, the performance evaluation approach employed in this study helps to deal 
with the problem of cross-sectional dependence across trades that hampers statistical 
inferences about the average abnormal performance in event studies. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 compares key 
characteristics of regulations of insider trading and reporting of insider trades in Europe. 
Section 3 presents data on insider transactions used in this paper and Section 4 introduces the 
methodology. Section 5 presents and discusses empirical results on the profitability of insider 
trading in Europe, including a battery of robustness checks, tests in subsamples and the 
impact of the MAD on insider profits. Section 6 explores cross-country determinants of the 
profitability of insider trading, and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
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2. Review of Insider Trading Regulations2 
At the country level, transactions by corporate insiders are subject to legal rules and 
further regulations imposed by stock exchanges or stock market regulators. As documented 
by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), laws prohibiting trading on undisclosed price-sensitive 
information exist in all developed markets and in the majority of emerging markets but their 
wide-spread introduction is only a phenomenon of the 1990s. In the European Economic 
Area (E.E.A.), of which all of our sample countries except for Switzerland are members
3
, 
national insider trading regulatory frameworks now follow the European Union (E.U.) 
Market Abuse Directive (MAD). The MAD – Directive 2003/6/EC – aims to develop and 
unify regulations across E.E.A. member states to curb insider trading and market 
manipulation as two forms of market abuse to ensure integrity of financial markets and to 
enhance investor confidence in financial markets. The MAD was introduced in 2003 and was 
enacted in legislations of individual E.E.A. countries between April 2004 and January 2007 
(Christensen et al., 2016). 
Regarding the reporting of transaction by corporate insiders, the MAD specifies that 
individuals who discharge managerial responsibilities must notify relevant authorities of their 
transactions in their firms’ securities, and that such information should be made publically 
available. The requirement of public announcements of insider transactions was new to some 
countries but there were E.U. countries (for example, the U.K, Germany or the Netherlands) 
in which insider transactions were reported before the MAD. The aim of the MAD was to 
develop unified regulations across Europe. 
                                                          
2
 This section outlines regulations in place at the end of the sample period of this paper (December 2012), 
relevant for the analysis of empirical results. In 2016 the regulations across the European Economic Area 
(E.E.A.) were replaced by the new European Union (E.U.) Market Abuse Regulation (MAR). 
3
 The majority of our sample countries are members the E.U. and hence E.E.A. Iceland and Norway are not 
members of the E.U. but they adopted the E.U. capital markets directives, including the MAD, as members of 
the E.E.A. Switzerland is neither an E.U. nor E.E.A. member and therefore did not adopt the E.U. directives. 
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A follow-up Directive 2004/72/EC focuses on specific implementation of the MAD 
related to, among others, notification of insiders’ transactions. It specifies that corporate 
insiders obliged to report their transactions include members of the administrative, 
management or supervisory bodies of the firm or senior executives who are not members of 
those bodies but who have regular access to inside information. The reporting of the 
transaction should be made within five working days of the transaction date. The directive 
also allows the E.E.A. member states to exempt from reporting small trades, defined as trades 
with the total value of less than EUR 5,000 within a calendar year. 
Individual stock market authorities can introduce stricter reporting rules or rules in 
areas not covered by the directives. One example of such areas are the so called ‘closed 
periods’ during which corporate insiders are not allowed to trade at all. If closed periods are 
introduced, they are normally associated with earnings announcements before which insiders 
are assumed to have the largest information advantaged compared to the general public.
4
 
Table 1 summarizes key characteristics of regulations related to trading and trade 
reporting by corporate insiders across our sample countries. These characteristics include 
reporting deadlines, exclusions from reporting requirements and any closed periods 
introduced at the country level. They have a potential impact on insider trading returns this 
paper analyzes. Insiders can trade more strategically if they can delay reporting (e.g., Betzer 
and Theissen, 2010; Betzer et al., 2015), and closed periods potentially limit insiders’ profits 
by restricting trading when insiders have a large information advantage (e.g., Betzer and 
Theissen, 2009). 
As indicated in the table, all countries allow at most 5 working days for reporting of 
share transactions, in line with the E.U. directives. Nine of the sample countries introduced a 
stricter deadline and accelerated reporting, ranging from immediate disclosure to the deadline 
                                                          
4
 The E.U. Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) enacted in 2016 introduced mandatory closed periods throughout 
the E.E.A. countries. 
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of four working days. Those countries include Switzerland which does not adopt the E.U. 
directives. Interestingly, Iceland and the Netherlands apply selective deadlines requiring top 
executives to report their trades immediately, sooner than other insiders. Nine countries 
adopted the exemption of reporting of small trades, as guided by the Directive 2004/72/EC, 
and Switzerland introduced a higher threshold for trades which are made public by the SIX 
Swiss Exchange – transactions that total less than CHF 100,000 in a calendar month, even 
though reported by insiders to the exchange, are not published. 
Seven countries introduced mandatory closed periods in which insiders must not 
trade. These are either fixed closed periods at the country level in Estonia, France, Ireland, 
Sweden and the U.K., or requirements of closed periods at the firm level in Denmark and the 
Netherlands. The closed periods have different lengths across countries. For example, in 
France insiders are not allowed to trade in the period of 15 days before earnings 
announcements, in Sweden the closed period is 30 days long, and in Ireland and the U.K. it is 
as long as 60 days before the publication of annual results. Furthermore, Iceland recommends 
firms to introduce closed periods but there is no strict requirement, and even though in 
Switzerland there is no mandated closed periods, insiders are advised not to trade 20 days 
before earnings announcements. 
 
3. Insider Trading Data 
Data on reported insider transactions are sourced from Directors Deals Ltd 
(www.directorsdeals.com). The sample includes countries with insider trading data covering 
at least 5 years and all data series run until the end of 2012. The data set identifies the name 
and position of the insider, firm identifiers, date of the transaction, type of the transaction, the 
security involved, and transaction price and volume. Similarly to the standard approach in the 
literature (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jeng et al., 2003), we focus on open-market 
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purchase and sale transactions in shares, and exclude share grants, transfers and option 
exercises. The rationale is to focus on transactions initiated by insiders, in which they have 
discretion regarding the timing and volume of trading. Data provided by Directors Deals Ltd 
contain transactions with a value of at least GBP 10,000 (or equivalent in the local currency). 
Details of data coverage are presented in Table 2. The full sample contains over 
166,000 transactions, split between over 99,000 purchases and 67,000 sales. Starting months 
for individual countries differ and are mainly driven by different introduction dates of 
national insider trading rules that made reporting of insider transactions mandatory. The 
longest series covering 14 years are available for Ireland and the U.K., while Greece has the 
shortest coverage of 5 years (countries with even shorter histories of data were excluded from 
the analysis). The average number of transactions per month varies mainly with the market 
size. The largest number of purchases per month is observed for France, Germany, Greece 
and the U.K., while the largest number of sales is recorded for France, Germany, Italy and the 
U.K. Not surprisingly, small stock markets of Estonia, Iceland and Latvia have the smallest 
number of trades. For only three countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland) the 
number of insider sale transactions is greater that the number of purchase transactions. 
However, sale transactions tend to be larger and hence the average volume of sales per month 
is larger than the volume of purchases in 13 out of the 18 sample countries. The only 
countries in which insiders, on average, buy more shares than sell are Greece, Ireland, Latvia, 
Lithuania and the Netherlands. Insiders sell more than buy in response to equity-based 
compensation when they rebalance their portfolios or gain liquidity following stock or option 
grants and exercises. Fernandes et al. (2013) show that even though the importance of equity-
based compensation in Europe is lower than in the U.S., still the equity incentive pay in 
European companies typically accounts for more than 10% of the average CEO pay package. 
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4. Performance Evaluation Methodology 
The methodology of our empirical analysis closely follows the approach initially 
proposed by Jeng et al. (2003). We build portfolios that mimic separately all insider 
purchases and sales in a given country, with purchase (sale) portfolios created by adding to a 
hypothetical portfolio all shares purchased (sold) by insiders on any given day and holding 
them over a specified period. Similarly to Jeng et al. (2003), we consider closing prices on 
the reported transaction dates as prices at which stocks are added to the mimicking portfolios. 
We choose to focus on four different holding horizons: 20, 65, 130, 260 trading days, which 
is equivalent to approximately 1, 3, 6 and 12 calendar months, to observe how realizable 
returns to insider portfolios behave over time. As a result, a purchase (sale) portfolio with, for 
example, the 20-day holding period contains all shares purchased (sold) by insiders in a given 
country over the previous 20 trading days. Based on portfolio constituents each day, we 
calculate value-weighted daily portfolio returns using data on closing prices and total daily 
returns on individual stocks, both sourced from Datastream. All calculations are done in local 
currencies to avoid the results being influenced by exchange rate movements. If a portfolio is 
empty on a given day, which may happen for small markets with a short assumed holding 
period, the portfolio return on that day is set to zero.
5
 Daily portfolio returns are then 
compounded to monthly returns for each calendar month in the sample period. We analyze 
performance of insider portfolios using monthly returns as they are less noisy than daily ones. 
The performance of insider portfolios is benchmarked against the one-factor model: 
 Rpt,i – Rft,i = αi + i RMRFt,i + εpt,i, (1) 
where Rpt,i is the return on the insider portfolio in month t and country i, Rft,i is the risk-free 
rate in month t and country i, and RMRFt,i is the month t’s excess return on the stock market 
                                                          
5
 Because empty sets on specific days can bias our results against finding significant outperformance, as a 
robustness check we also repeat the analysis for the countries with the largest number of listed stocks which are 
less likely to be affected by this problem. See the end of this Section for details. 
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in country i over the risk free rate in that country. We use the local three-month interbank rate 
as a proxy for the risk-free rate in each country, and three-month Euribor is used for countries 
in the Euro area. MSCI total return indices (in local currencies) proxy for stock market 
portfolios in all countries except for Iceland, Latvia and Lithuania for which MSCI indices 
are not available and local OMX price indices are used instead. The interbank rates and index 
data are collected from Datastream. i is the portfolio’s Jensen’s  and it measures the 
monthly risk-adjusted return on the portfolio. Statistically significant insider trading returns 
to purchase portfolios will be reflected in significant positive ’s, while returns to sale 
portfolios will be reflected in negative ’s, indicating avoided losses. To make the results 
fully comparable across countries, all baseline tests are estimated for trades in a unified 
window of 2008 to 2012. 
 In addition to the baseline tests, we perform a few checks to test if the results are 
robust to the choice of the estimation method, sample composition and sample period. We 
start with addressing the problem of the possible bias in  estimates due to thin trading 
(Scholes and Williams, 1977; Dimson, 1979). We address this issue in three different ways. 
First, we estimate simple market-adjusted returns of insider portfolios by restricting i in 
model (1) to one. The test answers the question of whether insiders beat their respective 
market, without any possibly imperfect risk adjustment of returns. Second, we extend model 
(1) to include the lagged excess market return
6
: 
 Rpt,i – Rft,i = αi + 1i RMRFt,i + 2i RMRFt-1,i + εpt,i, (2) 
with all notation as in model (1). Third, we exclude from the analysis countries with the 
smallest number of listed firms. Those countries are likely to have least liquid stock markets 
and insider portfolios replicated for those countries are also more likely to be empty on some 
days, or contain few stocks. Here, we drop countries with fewer than 100 stocks traded on the 
                                                          
6
 See Ritter and Welch (2002) for application of such a model to test performance of a portfolio of IPO firms. 
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stock market throughout the sample period, as reported in the World Bank World 
Development Indicators (WDI). This requirement limits the sample to 12 countries. The 
excluded countries are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia and Lithuania. 
As presented in Table 2, these are also the countries with the six smallest average numbers of 
insider transactions per month which corroborates the expectation that the exclusion will limit 
the number of countries with insider portfolios containing few stocks or, in the extreme, 
being empty.
7
 
 As a supplementary test of the performance of insider portfolios we also use an 
alternative, four-factor benchmark model of Carhart (1997): 
 Rpt,i – Rft,i = αi + 1i RMRFt,i + 2i SMBt,i + 3i HMLt,i + 4i MOMt,i + εpt,i, (3) 
where SMBt,i stands for month t’s return on a portfolio of small firms less the return on a 
portfolio of large firms in country i, HMLt,i stands for month t’s return on a portfolio of high 
book-to-market firms less the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market firms in country i, 
and MOMt,i stands for month t’s return on a portfolio of past ‘winners’ less the return on a 
portfolio of past ‘losers’ in country i. Data on factor returns is obtained from AQR website8, 
and the factors are constructed as in Asness and Frazzini (2013) and Asness et al. (2014). 
They are available for 13 countries in our sample.
9
 Factor returns from AQR are calculated in 
U.S. dollars and for consistency with all other tests in the paper we convert them to local 
currencies using data on exchange rates sourced from Datastream. In contrast to Jeng et al. 
(2003), we employ the four-factor model only as a supplementary check given the mixed 
evidence on the performance of three- and four-factor models in Europe.
10
 
                                                          
7
 Detailed estimation results of the baseline model reported in Appendix A and B reveal that the six countries 
filtered out using this approach are the only countries in the sample for which monthly aggregation yields at 
least one month with an empty portfolio throughout. 
8
 https://www.aqr.com/library/data-sets 
9
 The data is unavailable for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia and Lithuania. 
10
 E.g., Fletcher (2001), Bauer et al. (2010), Fama and French (2012), Artmann et al. (2012), Gregory et al. 
(2013). Additionally, the problem of determining breakpoints for benchmark portfolios reduces the applicability 
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In addition to the baseline tests covering the 2008-2012 period for each country, we 
perform two further robustness checks by varying the sample period. First, we exclude from 
the analysis year 2008 to assess if the results change when we focus only on the post-crisis 
2009-2012 period.
11
 Second, we estimate α’s of insider portfolios using all available 
observations for each country, as reported in Table 2. The estimation window is no longer 
unified but the approach allows us to increase the statistical power of our tests by increasing 
the number of monthly observations where available. The two tests in different sample 
windows also shed light on the stability of insider performance over time. 
 
5. Profits to Insider Trading in Europe 
5.1. Baseline Empirical Tests 
This section provides evidence on the profitably of insider trading in Europe in the 
period 2008-2012, with the focus on the number of countries in which portfolios that mimic 
insider trades generate statistically significant α’s.12 As presented in Panel A of Table 3, α’s 
of portfolios mimicking purchase transactions are significantly positive only in three 
countries and for the shortest, 20-day holding period. Those countries are the U.K. (α of 
3.71%, 54.8% annualized), Germany (α of 2.73%, 38.2% annualized) and Norway (α of 
2.64%, 36.7% annualized).
13
 For other horizons, α’s are insignificant, with the exception of 
one negative α for the 65-day horizon. For sell transactions (Panel B of Table 3), there is only 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of the four-factor model in European countries (e.g., Dimson et al., 2003; Gregory et al., 2003). See Michou et 
al. (2014) for a comprehensive review of alternative approaches to estimation of risk factors. 
11
 In the literature there is no agreement on the exact timing of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Dungey et al. 
(2015) scrutinize 24 papers and reveal a wide disagreement regarding the starting and the end-date of that crisis 
episode: the beginning of the crisis is generally assumed to have occurred between January and August 2007, 
and the end-dates vary between January 2008 (for the subprime crisis) and July 2010. Four papers are reported 
to set the crisis end-date as December 2008, as we do, while further seven studies assume the crisis to have 
ended before that date. Dungey et al. (2015) themselves estimate the crisis dates endogenously and date the end 
of the first phase on October 5, 2008 and of the second, final phase on May 15, 2009. Hence, our decision to 
regard the 2009-2012 period as a post crisis era fits well into the existing literature. 
12
 Throughout the paper, results are denoted as statistically significant if the p-value of the respective 
significance test is lower or equal to 5 percent. 
13
 Full estimation results of the baseline model for individual countries are presented in Appendix A (purchases) 
and Appendix B (sales). 
14 
 
one significantly negative α for the 65-day horizon (Norway with α of -1.74%, -19.0% 
annualized) and one for the longest, 260-day holding period (Denmark with α of -1.44%, -
16.0% annualized). Interestingly, for longer holding periods some α’s of sale portfolios are 
significantly positive. Overall, the results indicate that insiders in only few European 
countries generate significant realizable returns when trading shares in their firms. 
The average α for purchases over the 20-day horizon is 1.01% (12.8% annualized). It 
goes down over longer horizons but for the longest, 260-day holding period it edges higher to 
0.41% (5.0% annualized). Similarly, the average profitability of sale portfolios decreases 
with the holding horizon, from the average 20-day α of -0.33% (avoided monthly losses of 33 
basis points) to positive 0.37% for the 260-day holding period indicating unprofitable selling 
before share price increases. Decreasing realizable insider trading profits for both purchases 
and sales indicate that insiders’ information advantage is short-lived. Jeng et al. (2003) find a 
similar trend for U.S. insiders. They document that as much as one quarter of insider profits 
come in the first five days and about a half come in the first month. Beyond the first month, 
the abnormal performance is much weaker. 
Our results for the 130 trading-day holding period (approximately 6 months) can be 
compared with the results in Jeng et al. (2003) for the U.S. market. Jeng et al. (2003) find that 
the U.S. insider purchase portfolio outperforms the CAPM benchmark by statistically 
significant 68 basis points per month, and their α for the sale portfolio is insignificant with 
the point estimate of -17 basis points per month. Our estimates are on average lower with few 
of them statistically significant. Our mean (median) α of the purchase portfolio is 21 basis 
points (37 basis points). Our mean point estimate of α of the sale portfolio is -1 basis point, 
with the median of -9 basis points. When comparing the results, a possible concern is that the 
lower significance level of our estimates is driven by a smaller number of monthly return 
observations compared to Jeng et al. (2003), as smaller samples suffer from the reduced 
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power of tests. The insider transaction data set in Jeng et al. (2003) covers over 21 years, 
while our data for the baseline tests reported in Table 3 spans five years. To address this 
concern, in unreported tests we re-run regression (1) with all monthly observations pooled 
across our sample countries, with standard errors clustered two-way by country and month. 
The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to results in Table 3. For the 130-day 
holding period, α of the purchase portfolio is 20 basis points per month (p-value of 0.51), and 
for the sale portfolio it is -8 basis points (p-value of 0.81). Another concern is a possible trend 
in profitability of insider trading over time driven by changing regulations and/or detection or 
enforcement methods. The data set used in Jeng et al. (2003) runs until 1996 while our 
European data set covers a much more recent period. However, Lee et al. (2014) document 
that despite changes in regulations and a larger fraction of firms adopting internal insider 
trading policies over their 1986-2010 sample period, U.S. insiders continue to profit from 
purchase transactions but are more cautious when selling on negative private information. 
Furthermore, in Section 5.4 below we show that the results in our sample are also stable over 
time. Altogether, the differences in point estimates between our results and the results in Jeng 
et al. (2003), as well as the variability of α’s across countries within our sample, suggest that 
country-level factors have an impact on trading performance of corporate insiders. 
The low estimated profitability of insider trading in Europe could potentially also be 
an effect of an estimation bias when individual stock markets are illiquid and, additionally, 
insiders do not trade frequently, leading to empty insider portfolios. We find that the problem 
of empty mimicking portfolios affects to some extent six sample countries
14
 (the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia and Lithuania) which have at least one month in 
the sample when the mimicking portfolio is empty throughout. However, the problem is 
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 See Appendices A and B for details. 
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potentially severe only in Latvia for portfolios with the short holding period. We address the 
concern of biased results in a comprehensive way in the following section. 
 
5.2. Robustness Checks 
We perform a battery of checks to test if the results presented in the previous section 
are robust to the choice of the estimation method, sample composition and the choice of the 
sample period. 
Robustness tests for purchase transactions are reported in Panel A of Table 4. As 
discussed in Section 4, three of these tests, reported in Panels A1 to A3, address the possible 
bias in results due to biased  estimates in markets with thin trading and/or empty insider 
portfolios. In the robustness checks, the evidence of insider profitability over the shortest, 20-
day holding period becomes somewhat stronger. When the CAPM  is restricted to one 
(Panel A1), or when the lagged market excess return is included (Panel A2)
15, α’s are 
statistically significant in four countries as opposed to three countries in the baseline tests. α’s 
for U.K., Germany and Norway remain significant in both scenarios, and they are joined by 
the α for Greece in tests with the  set to one and by the α for Ireland when the lagged market 
return is included. The mean α of purchase portfolios is also higher compared to baseline 
tests across holding horizons, with the exception for the longest, 260-day holding period. 
When the sample is restricted to 12 countries with the largest stock markets in our sample 
(Panel A3), the mean α goes up compared to the baseline tests for the shortest holding period 
but is reduced over longer horizons. Across all robustness tests, there is evidence of realizable 
returns decreasing with the holding horizon. 
                                                          
15
 In regressions for purchase transactions, the coefficient of the lagged excess market return is statistically 
significant for five countries for the 20-day holding period, five countries for the 65-day holding period, nine 
countries for the 130-day holding period and seven countries for the 260-day holding period. For sales, it is 
significant, respectively, in four, three, four and three countries. 
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The same robustness checks for sales portfolios are reported in Panels B1 to B3 of 
Table 4. The overall picture emerging from the baseline tests reported in the previous section 
is not altered and the robustness checks confirm that insiders do not sell shares in own 
companies profitably. There is a mix of significant positive and negative α’s across tests and 
across horizons. 
Taken together, given the evidence of the robustness of our findings to various 
approaches that are designed to address the potential problem of low market liquidity and 
infrequent insider trading, we can conclude that our key findings of low profitability of 
insider trading in Europe are not driven by potential estimation biases resulting from these 
phenomena. 
As the one-factor CAPM model in equation (1) could fail to capture all relevant 
systematic risk factors affecting asset returns, we also employ the four-factors model for 
which the results are presented in Panels A4 (purchases) and B4 (sales). For purchases, the 
results are somewhat stronger compared to the single factor model. α is significant in 4 
countries (Germany, Ireland, Norway and the U.K.) for the 20-day holding period, 2 
countries (Belgium and the U.K.) for the 65-day holding period, one country (Belgium) for 
the 130-day holding period and 2 countries (Germany and Norway) for the longest, 260-day 
holding period. Still, in the majority of sample countries portfolios that mimic insider 
purchase transactions do not outperform the four-factor benchmark in a statistically 
significant way. Similar to all other tests, the mean α is highest for the short holding period of 
20 trading days (1.54%, 20.1% annualized). Again, in line with other results, we fail to find 
significant outperformance of sale portfolios in results reported in Panel B4. If anything, we 
find some evidence of underperformance reflected in a few positive α’s indicating insider 
selling ahead of price increases. Full estimation results for the four-factor models are not 
reported to save space but, overall, coefficients of the SMB factor are significant and all 
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positive for 18 of the 52 purchase portfolios (4 different holding periods across 13 countries) 
and for 10 of the 52 sales portfolios, indicating that, on average, insiders tend to trade in 
small firms. For the HML factor, there are 9 significantly negative and 2 significantly 
positive coefficients for purchase portfolios and 6 significantly negative and 1 significantly 
positive coefficients for sale portfolios. The loadings on the MOM factor are significant and 
all negative for 21 purchase portfolios, confirming that insiders are contrarians with their 
aggregate purchase portfolios tilted towards past losers (e.g., Jenter, 2005; Gregory et al., 
2013). The results for sale portfolios are less clear-cut with 3 significantly positive and 7 
significantly negative coefficients of the MOM factor. 
Results presented in Panels A5 and B5 of Table 4 are estimated for a shorter sample 
period that excludes the year 2008, in which the results can be affected by the financial crisis 
of 2007-2008. For purchase transactions (Panel A5) and the 20-day holding period, α’s of 
portfolios mimicking insider trades in Germany, Norway and the U.K., significant in the 
baseline tests, remain significant, but there are two further significant α’s: in France and 
Greece. There is only one significant α for each of the remaining windows – in Norway (65-
day holding period), Germany (130-day holding period) and Belgium (260-day holding 
period). Mean α’s decrease with the holding period, and with the exception of the longest 
holding period are larger than in baseline tests reported in Table 3. For sale transactions 
(Panel B5), as in other tests of performance of insider sale portfolios, there is no evidence of 
significant outperformance of the benchmark. 
Panels A6 and B6 report α’s of insider portfolios using all available observations for 
each country. As sample periods differ across countries here, we lose the direct comparability 
of the results across countries but are able to fully exploit the largest cross-country sample of 
reported share transactions by corporate insiders to date. For purchase transactions (Panel 
A4), there is no substantial shift in the pattern of the average profitability compared to the 
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baseline tests reported in Table 3, but there is an increase in the number of statistically 
significant α’s across all holding horizons. Five countries (U.K., Germany, Norway, Ireland 
and France) have significant α’s for the 20-day holding period, two (U.K. and Ireland) for the 
65-day holding period, two (U.K. and Estonia) for the 130-day holding period and one (U.K.) 
for the longest, 260-day holding period. The decreasing number of significant α’s with the 
horizon, as well as the monotonically decreasing mean α, from 1.03% (13.1% annualized) for 
the 20-day holding period to 0.04% (0.5% annualized) for the 260-day holding period, 
confirm the overall picture of the short-lived nature of insider informational advantage. In 
line with this argument, α’s in the U.K., significant for all holding periods, also reveal a 
monotonically decreasing trend, from 3.34% (48.3% annualized) for the 20-day holding 
period to 0.72% (9.0%) for the 260-day holding period. For sale portfolios, the tests that use 
all available observations for each country (Panel B6 of Table 4) reveal, again, the lack of 
conclusive evidence of the profitability of insider trading. There are both significantly 
positive and negative α’s. 
Overall, the comparison of the baseline results for the unified sample period of 2008-
2012 (Table 3) and robustness test results using a shorter post-crisis period of 2009-2012 
(Table 4, Panels A5 and B5) or all available transactions (Table 4, Panels A6 and B6) shows 
that the average profitability of insider trading (average α) varies slightly over time. 
However, we can rule out the possibility that the larger number of significant α’s in the 
maximum window available for each country is purely driven by a higher statistical power 
due to the larger number of observations as we find a similar higher number of significant α’s 
compared to the baseline tests for an even shorter window of 2009-2012. In Section 5.4 
below we formally test, wherever data permits, for statistically significant trends or shifts in 
insider trading profitability over time, including the test of the impact the enactment of the 
Market Abuse Directive had on returns to insider portfolios. 
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Taken together, the battery of checks performed in this Section reveals that the overall 
picture emerging from the baseline tests holds – we fail to find evidence that insider-
mimicking portfolios in Europe systematically beat their respective market benchmarks. α's 
in the vast majority of countries are insignificant, with any significant performance 
concentrated largely in the shortest holding period. The results vary somewhat with the 
estimation method or the sample period but overall we can conclude that the performance of 
insiders in Europe, and particularly in continental Europe, differs starkly from the one 
reported for U.S. insiders in Jeng et al. (2003). 
 
5.3. Profits across Firms with Different Characteristics 
To shed additional light on the profitability of insider trading in Europe we develop a 
set of further empirical tests. In this subsection we disaggregate the sample to test insider 
trading profits across firms with specific characteristics related to transparency. It is possible 
that while insider portfolios at the country level generate insignificant returns, subsamples of 
firms based on specific characteristics can offer significant profits to insider trading. 
The underpinning argument is that insider trading profits are lower when insiders 
have a lower information advantage. We base on the premise that the information advantage 
is diminished with greater transparency, when more information becomes publically available 
and/or when specific ownership structures reduce insiders’ information asymmetry through 
closer monitoring. Consequently, we test if the profitability of insider trading is lower in 
firms which are more transparent (larger firms, firms with analyst following and firms in 
traditional industries as opposed to high-tech firms) and in firms with concentrated holdings 
in which block holders closely monitor the firm. The earlier literature using U.S. data 
confirms that abnormal stock returns following insider transactions are higher in smaller 
firms and in firms with lower analyst coverage (e.g. Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Frankel and 
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Li, 2004), and it is also documented that in the U.K. and Germany post-trade abnormal 
returns are lower in closely held companies (Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Betzer and Theissen, 
2009).
16
 
For a meaningful comparison we limit the analysis to 12 countries with at least 100 
stocks traded on the stock market throughout the sample period, as reported in the World 
Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). Market capitalization data is taken from 
Datastream. Closely held shares are from Worldscope and are defined as the percentage of 
shares outstanding held by officers and directors, their immediate families, other individuals 
who hold more than 5 percent of shares, and other corporations. Both market capitalization 
and closely held shares are measured at the beginning of the year in which the trade took 
place. Analyst coverage is taken from IBES and is defined as the number of earnings 
forecasts in the month prior to the annual earnings announcement made in the year preceding 
the year of the trade. Industry classification is based on the 4-digit SIC code and high-tech 
firms are identified following Pagano et al. (2002). We form within-country groups every 
calendar year. We use the median market capitalization and median closely held shares 
calculated for all firms with at least one insider trade in the year in the given country to divide 
the firms in two groups, accordingly. Firms with a non-zero number of earnings estimates are 
classified as firms with analyst coverage, and as firms without analyst coverage otherwise. 
The results are reported in Table 5, Panel A (purchases) and Panel B (sales). For this 
and subsequent tests, to save space, we report only results for the shortest, 20-day, and the 
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 As noted by Fidrmuc et al. (2006), concentrated holdings do not only proxy for the information asymmetry 
but can alternatively be interpreted from the perspective of the agency theory and incentive alignment and 
managerial entrenchment. Consistent with the agency argumentation, insider buying in firms with low 
ownership concentration increases the alignment of insiders’ and outside shareholders’ interests which is 
perceived as good news and hence increases share prices more than insider buying when ownership, and 
specifically insider ownership, is concentrated. With concentrated holdings, further purchases increase the 
entrenchment effect insulating insiders from disciplinary actions in the event of poor performance. 
Consequently, insider buying in firms with concentrated ownership is seen by the market as less positive news 
leading to a weaker stock price reaction. 
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longest, 260-day holding period.
17
 Overall, there are few significant differences in insider 
trading profitability between groups and the results in sub-samples are similar to the full-
sample results presented in earlier sections. In the majority of countries insider trading is 
unprofitable, with significant α’s for selected purchase portfolios and mainly with the 
assumed shortest, 20-day holding horizon. 
For both purchases and sales, there is some evidence that insider trading tends to be 
more profitable in firms with lower market capitalization (Panels A1 and B1), consistent with 
greater information advantage of corporate insiders in less transparent smaller firms. 
However, for purchases the difference is statistically insignificant and holds only for the short 
horizon, while it is consistent with the prediction for sales over both horizons but is 
significant only for the 260-day holding period. The difference in mean α’s reaches 84 basis 
points for sales portfolios over the 260-day holding period. 
In contrast to our expectations, insider purchase profits are larger in firms in 
traditional industries rather than in high-tech firms (Panel A3). Insider purchase profits are 
also somewhat larger, albeit insignificantly, in firms with a lower percentage of closely held 
shares (Panel A4). The difference in mean α’s is 14-16 basis points. The sign of the 
difference is consistent with the hypothesis that closer monitoring by controlling shareholders 
diminishes the insiders’ information advantage but the lack of statistical significance 
precludes any strong conclusions. 
In summary, we can rule out the possibility that while, overall, insider trading in 
Europe tends to be unprofitable, there are subsamples based on firm characteristics in which 
there is evidence of consistently significant insider trading α’s. 
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 Full results are available from the authors upon request. 
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5.4. The Impact of the Market Abuse Directive on Insider Profits 
The comprehensive evidence presented so far reveals that insiders in few European 
countries trade profitably in their firms’ shares. The majority of the tests were performed on 
data covering the period 2008-2012 when the MAD was in place in the sample countries. In 
this subsection we provide supplementary time series evidence to check if α’s to insider 
portfolios change at the time when the MAD was introduced in individual countries. As 
outlined in Section 2, the MAD was designed to unify regulations across the E.U. countries 
and step up efforts to combat insider trading and market abuse in financial markets. 
We start with presenting in Table 6 information on the number of insider transactions 
and trading volume before and after the MAD was enacted in the national legislation in five 
countries for which we have sufficiently long time series covering the pre- and post-MAD 
periods (Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and the U.K.). For a better direct 
comparison, we trim series for each country to start in January 2003. The evidence clearly 
shows a significant increase in at least one of the measures across countries. The average 
monthly number of purchases increases significantly in four countries (all except the U.K.) 
but the average purchase volume goes significantly up in only one of them (Italy), indicating 
that insiders tend to buy shares more frequently but in lower quantities per trade. Similarly 
for sales, in Ireland and the U.K. the number of transactions goes significantly up with an 
insignificant change in the average monthly volume. On the other hand, in Germany, Italy 
and the Netherlands the sales volume goes significantly up but the average number of 
transactions does not change significantly which indicates that insiders in those countries do 
not sell shares more frequently but do so in larger quantities. 
The results present a mixed picture of insiders trading after the MAD more frequently 
but in lower quantities or trading with the same frequency but in larger quantities. However, 
it is also possible that the stricter MAD rules did not change trading patterns but forced 
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insiders to report more transactions, or higher volumes of transactions, that otherwise were 
not reported in the pre-MAD period. We are not able to assess the scale of non-compliance 
with reporting regulations over time in our sample but Bajo et al. (2009) estimate that in Italy 
in 2003 (in the pre-MAD period) only 29.6% of insiders complied with regulations and fully 
reported their trading activity. Interestingly, our data for Italy reveal a sharp increase in the 
number of both purchases and sales and a sharp rise in the volume of sales in the post-MAD 
period. In fact, among the five countries analyzed, for Italy we observe the largest percentage 
increase in the number of purchases and the largest percentage increase in the sale volume, 
and the second largest increase in purchase volume. 
We now turn to the analysis of the impact of the MAD on α’s of insider portfolios. 
Introduction of the MAD can have two opposite effects on insider trading profits. On the one 
hand, if the MAD creates disincentives for corporate insiders to trade on inside information, 
then we should observe a decrease in the average profitability of insider trading around and 
following the enactment of the MAD. On the other hand, if the MAD increases market 
cleanliness by reducing insider trading across the market, those insiders who do continue to 
trade on inside information under the MAD could be able to obtain higher profits. Such an 
undesirable consequence of insider trading regulations is documented by Bris (2005), who 
finds that profits to trading on inside information ahead of acquisition announcements 
increase rather than decrease after the initial enforcement of insider trading laws in a country. 
In other words, discouraging widespread trading on inside information can create monopoly 
profits for those who still decide to trade.
18
 Even though Bris (2005) looks at unreported 
trades, the argument can be translated to the context of this paper – with less information 
incorporated in stock prices by informed traders, there is a larger scope for profits for those 
who trade on private information, no matter whether those informed trades are disclosed or 
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 The argument is related to the observation in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) that more insiders compete away 
insider profits. 
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not. In a related study, Griffin et al. (2011) find that stock prices move less on public 
information announcement when (undisclosed) insider trading is more prevalent, consistent 
with the notion that informed traders incorporate value-relevant information before it is 
publically released. The prevalence of insider trading is likely to be correlated with insider 
trading regulations. How the regulations affect the profitability of reported trades by 
corporate insiders remains an open question. 
An alternative argument on a positive link between the strictness of insider trading 
regulations and profits to corporate insiders can be drawn based on the intuition suggested by 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) that stricter regulations encourage more trading from outside 
investors increasing the liquidity of the market and hence allowing insiders to trade more 
profitably in more liquid markets. In fact, Christensen et al. (2016) document positive effects 
of the introduction of the MAD on stock market liquidity. In a similar context, Seyhun (1992) 
finds that the increase in the level and enforcement of insider trading regulations in the U.S. 
in the 1980s did not limit, but rather increased the volume and profitability of reported 
trading by corporate insiders. 
We run a time series test to verify if the profitability of insider trading changes around 
the implementation of the Directive into local laws. To this end, the following model is 
estimated: 
 Rpt,i – Rft,i = αi + i MADt,i + i RMRFt,i + εpt,i, (4) 
where MADt,i is a dummy variable equal to one after the MAD was incorporated in local laws 
in country i, and it is equal to zero otherwise. MAD implementation dates are from 
Christensen et al. (2016). The coefficient of MADt,i, i, measures the change in profitability, 
i.e. the change in α of insider portfolios after introduction of the MAD compared to the pre-
MAD period. All other notation is as before. To provide a direct comparison, for each 
country the regressions are run using monthly observations for the unified period 2003-2012. 
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Results presented in Table 7 show a mix of positive and negative but largely 
insignificant coefficients of the MAD dummy which indicates no systematic shift in α’s of 
insider portfolios around the implementation of the MAD. Only for Ireland the coefficients of 
the MAD dummy for purchase transaction are significant at the 10 percent level. They are 
positive indicating an increase in insider profits post-MAD but the increase comes after 
negative profits in the pre-MAD periods, as measured by the negative α. 
The result of, generally, no systematic change in insider profits around the enactment 
of the MAD can be interpreted in different ways. First, one possible interpretation is that the 
MAD was ineffective and did not change the trading behavior of corporate insiders which 
would have shifted the trading profits insiders make. For example, the penalties for insider 
trading in new regulations are not severe enough to deter insider trading while, as 
documented by Bris (2005), the severity of penalties under insider trading laws can have an 
effect. Second, it is possible that pre-MAD country-level insider trading regulations in the 
five countries included in this test were of high quality and the marginal effect of the MAD 
introduction was therefore limited there. Beny (2005) develops an index of the quality of 
insider trading regulations measured in the 1990s and all five countries included in this test 
score three out of the maximum four points. Third, it is also possible that the de jure 
introduction of the market abuse laws did not bring any change to insider trading, as the law 
is likely to remain de facto ineffective without enforcement (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002). 
We address the latter two issues in cross-sectional tests presented in Section 6 below. 
It is also possible that the enactment of the MAD had an effect on insider trading 
profits but the effect did not come as a shift in profits around the enactment date, which the 
regression analysis above is designed to pick up, but rather as a slow transition over time. A 
potential explanation for a progressive rather than abrupt effect of the MAD implementation 
on insiders’ behavior could be anticipation of the enactment, but also the full implementation 
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and enforcement took some time. To shed light on the possibility that insider trading profits 
change slowly over time, we provide a graphical analysis of the evolution of α estimated in a 
rolling five-year window using full time series available for Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the U.K. Figure 1 plots estimated α’s and their 95-percent confidence 
intervals for portfolios with the assumed 20-day holding period.
19
 Altogether, α's vary 
slightly over time but there is no evidence of any statistically significant time effects in 
insider performance. In sum, the graphical analysis corroborates the regression results 
presented in Table 7 of no significant changes in insider trading profits in the sample period, 
driven by the MAD or other developments such as regulations beyond the MAD or changes 
in insider trading detection methods. 
 
6. Cross-Country Determinants of Insider Profits 
6.1. Theoretical Considerations 
It is somewhat puzzling that insider portfolios in so few European countries yield 
significant realizable returns, in contrast to the evidence from the U.S. Why do not insiders in 
many European countries make profits from their reported transactions, at least over those 
hypothetical holding periods we investigate in our analysis? In this section we build on the 
heterogeneity of our sample countries across many dimensions to explore several regulatory, 
institutional and cultural factors that may affect profits to insider portfolios in a country to try 
to understand why insider trading profitability differs starkly across countries. 
First, we look at a few regulatory differences specifically related to insider trading. 
We analyze the extent to which the MAD is implemented and enforced across the sample 
countries and we also look at some of the differences in reporting of insider trades and in 
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 To save space, figures for other holding periods are not presented but available from the authors upon request. 
Most of the significant results reported in the paper are found for the 20-day holding period therefore we choose 
that period for presentation. 
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implementation of closed periods during which corporate insiders are not allowed to trade, as 
introduced in Section 2. 
Second, we look at a few economic factors which are driven by, or at least related to 
the legal origin of the country (see La Porta et al. (2008) for a review of the literature). In our 
sample the U.K. and Ireland belong to the group of common law countries, as does the U.S. 
On the other hand, the majority of European countries have a civil law legal tradition, divided 
into French, German and Scandinavian subtraditions, which are all represented in our sample. 
We investigate the link between insider profits and the following economic outcomes related 
to the legal origin: ownership structure, investor protection and executive compensation 
policies. 
Furthermore, we look at cross-country differences in cultural and social dimensions 
such as innovativeness and religiosity. Lastly, we consider the role of trading costs. Below 
we discuss in detail all factors analyzed. 
 
6.1.1. Strictness and Enforcement of Insider Trading Rules 
As introduced in Section 2, insider trading regulatory frameworks across the E.E.A. 
member countries comply with the relevant E.U. directives, including the MAD. However, as 
reported by Christensen et al. (2016) individual countries differ in the strictness of 
implementation of MAD rules and their enforcement. We employ that cross-country variation 
to test the link between the MAD and the profitability of insider portfolios. The test 
complements the time series evidence in Section 5.4 above which due to data availability is 
limited to a few countries only and cannot fully exploit cross-sectional differences in 
regulations and enforcement. 
As discussed in Section 5.4, the strictness of insider trading regulations can have 
opposite effects on profits to trading by corporate insiders. On the one hand, stricter rules can 
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discourage corporate insiders from trading on private information leading to a negative link 
between the strictness of regulations and insider profits. On the other hand, if stricter rules 
discourage trading on inside information across all investors, fewer insiders compete and 
hence corporate insiders who still trade can generate larger profits. Following this line of 
arguments, the link between the strictness of insider trading rules and insider α’s is expected 
to be positive. 
To measure the strictness of implementation of insider trading rules imposed by the 
MAD, we use the supervisory powers variable constructed by Christensen et al. (2016) based 
on a report by the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR). The variable 
measures the existence of powers available to local financial market authorities in a country 
associated with the translation of 86 specific MAD rules into local laws. Specifically, it 
equals the number of positive answers by the stock market authorities in the country to 86 
questions in a questionnaire.
20
 The higher the value of the variable, the larger the supervisory 
powers are regarding the transposition of the MAD into the country’s market abuse laws. As 
reported in Table 8, the variable ranges from 59 in Norway to 80 in Latvia, with the sample 
mean of 67. 
The law on the books can remain ineffective without enforcement (Bhattacharya and 
Daouk, 2002). Therefore we also test if the profits to insider trading in a country depend on 
an early enforcement action of MAD-based local laws. We source a relevant dummy variable 
from Christensen et al. (2016). The variable is equal to one if the authorities in the country 
took at least one enforcement action against violation of the MAD rules by 2009, and it is 
equal to zero otherwise. The variable is equal to one in 10 (59%) of the sample countries. 
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 For example, one of the questions is ‘Does your authority have the power to establish whether or not an 
individual has access to insider information?’ (see Christensen et al. (2016), footnote 27). 
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6.1.2. Closed Periods 
Closed periods are meant to restrict trading when insiders have a significant 
information advantage against the general public. Therefore, theoretically, insider trading 
should be less profitable in countries where regulations specify closed periods compared to 
countries where insiders are free to trade at any time. Previous empirical evidence is mixed in 
this respect though. On the one hand, Betzer and Theissen (2009) document that in Germany 
where closed periods are not introduced, insiders’ transactions prior to earnings 
announcements are more profitable compared to other trades. On the other hand, Hillier and 
Marshall (2002) analyze insider trading in the U.K. where insiders are not allowed to trade in 
the run-up to earnings announcements, and they conclude that even though closed periods 
affect the timing of insiders’ trades, they do not alter their performance and insiders 
consistently earn abnormal returns irrespective of when they trade. To test the impact of 
closed periods on profits to insider trading in our paper we define, based on the information 
presented in Table 1, a dummy variable equal to one if there is either a closed period at the 
country level (i.e. in Estonia, France, Ireland, Sweden and the U.K.) or when firms are 
required (but not 'recommended' or 'advised') to adopt a closed period at the firm level (i.e. in 
Denmark and the Netherlands). The variable is equal to zero for all other countries. 
6.1.3. Accelerated Trade Reporting 
It is documented that insiders act strategically to their own benefit when they can 
report their trades with a delay. Betzer and Theissen (2010) find that lax reporting 
requirements in Germany before 2004 allowed insiders to delay reporting and that the delays 
were longer in firms with weaker outside oversight. They also find that stock prices were 
distorted in the period between the trade and the related announcement. Betzer et al. (2015) 
analyze insider trading and trade reporting in the U.S. before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act when 
insiders could report their trades until the 10
th
 day of the month after the month of trading. 
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They find that stealth trading, that is breaking large orders into smaller transactions to 
conceal private information (Barclay and Warner, 1993), as well late reporting were 
widespread, and also more common in firms with weak monitoring. Furthermore, outside 
investors perceived stealth trades as more likely to be based on private information. 
Altogether, both studies conclude that their respective results lend support for shorter trade 
reporting deadlines. 
We test if insider trading profits are linked to reporting deadlines in our sample 
countries, as outlined in Section 2. We define a dummy variable equal to one if the disclosure 
of trades is accelerated and the reporting deadline is shorter than five working days mandated 
by the E.U. directives, even for a subset of trades (i.e., in Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Latvia, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Switzerland and the U.K.). The dummy is equal to zero 
otherwise. Even though the standard deadline of five days seems already strict compared to, 
for example, the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era in the U.S., the link between insider profits and 
reporting deadlines is worth testing. Jeng et al. (2003) document that as much as one quarter 
of six-month insider profits come in the first five days after the trade. Interestingly, the E.U. 
decided to review the five-day deadline and it was shortened to three days when the Market 
Abuse Regulation was introduced in 2016. Our results can hence shed light on whether 
accelerated reporting impacts on insider profits. 
6.1.4. Ownership Concentration 
As documented by LaPorta et al. (1998), there are significant differences in firms’ 
ownership structures across countries. Firms in common law countries tend to be widely held 
with dispersed ownership, and firm ownership in civil law countries is concentrated, with 
dominant large blockholders. Those findings are confirmed by Faccio and Lang (2002) in a 
detailed study of ownership and control structures of listed companies across Europe. 
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Ownership structures determine corporate transparency and disclosure regimes. As 
documented by Ball et al. (2000), high-quality public disclosure is prevalent in common law 
countries where outside shareholding is dispersed as it is required to solve the information 
asymmetry problem to enable monitoring of managers to reduce agency conflicts. On the 
other hand, in civil law countries with concentrated ownership structures, the information 
asymmetry is resolved via closer manager-shareholder contacts, private channels of 
communication and closer relations with key stakeholders. Altogether, it can be argued that 
corporate transparency is higher in common law countries compared with civil law countries 
(Bushman et al., 2004). 
We conjecture that private communication channels between managers, controlling 
shareholders and stakeholders in countries where ownership tends to be concentrated reduce 
the information advantage of corporate insiders. Private information can be incorporated in 
stock prices by actions of controlling owners, stakeholders or their associates, diminishing the 
scope for trading profits left to insiders. Earlier firm-level insider trading literature supports 
this view. Fidrmuc et al. (2006) provide evidence of lower abnormal returns following insider 
transactions in British firms controlled by other companies or by families and individuals 
unrelated to the directors, and, similarly, Betzer and Theissen (2009) show that post-trade 
abnormal returns to insiders in Germany are lower in closely-held firms compared to widely-
held corporations.
21
 The country-level evidence can complement these earlier studies and the 
within-country evidence presented in Section 5.3 above. Even though the analysis in Section 
5.3 does not yield statistically significant within-country results, there may still be differences 
across countries, particularly if cross-country differences in ownership structures are greater 
than within-country differences. Given the arguments in LaPorta et al. (1998) on the 
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 Our argument is also supported by other related empirical evidence linking concentrated ownership structures 
and incorporation of private information into stock prices (e.g. Brockman and Yan, 2009; Anderson et al., 2012; 
Boubaker et al., 2014; Borisova and Yadav, 2015). 
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importance of country-level regulations for ownership concentration, one can assume that this 
is the case. 
In sum, we expect a negative link between typical ownership concentration in a 
country and insider profits. We use the ownership concentration measure from LaPorta et al. 
(1998) as a country-level proxy for ownership structures. The measure is calculated as the 
mean combined ownership stake of 3 largest shareholders across 10 largest publically listed 
firms in the country. As reported in Table 8, the concentration is lowest in the U.K. (0.19) 
with much higher values in continental Europe, with the variable exceeding 0.50 in Greece, 
Italy, Belgium and Spain. 
6.1.5. Investor Protection 
Insider trading behavior can also be shaped by general standards of investor 
protection against expropriation by insiders. We proxy for investor protection using the anti-
self-dealing index developed by Djankov et al. (2008). The index measures the protection of 
minority shareholders’ rights in a hypothetical corporate transaction that enriches the 
management and controlling shareholders. The index takes the value between 0 and 1, and in 
our sample it ranges from 0.20 in the Netherlands to 0.95 in the U.K, with the sample mean 
of 0.41. 
The link between investor protection and abnormal stock returns following insider 
transactions has been explored in the literature before and the results are mixed. Ravina and 
Sapienza (2010) analyze a U.S. sample and find that cumulative abnormal returns after 
insider trades are lower in firms with better governance standards. The result may indicate 
that insiders in better governed firms are more restricted in trading on the basis of material 
information at the expense of outside investors. On the other hand, Cziraki et al. (2014) find 
that in Dutch firms with better investor protection standards abnormal returns following 
insider transactions are higher. They argue that profits from legal insider trading substitute for 
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sacrificed benefits from investor expropriation through other channels. As opposed to firm-
level tests within one country samples in Ravina and Sapienza (2010) and Cziraki et al. 
(2014), Fidrmuc et al. (2013) provide a cross-country analysis and find that abnormal stock 
price behavior following insider transactions is positively correlated with investor protection 
in a country. They interpret insider trades as information events and argue that insiders’ 
actions are more trustworthy and informative in a better corporate governance environment 
which leads to higher abnormal returns following purchases. For sales, investor protection 
reduces the negative information content as investors trust liquidity and diversification 
motives for trades more. In light of the mixed prior results, we do not have strong theoretical 
priors regarding the link between insider trading profits and the quality of investor protection. 
6.1.6. Compensation Policies 
Fernandes et al. (2013) document that the ratio of equity-based pay (share and share 
option grants) to total pay differs across countries. Prevalent executive compensation policies 
in a country can in turn have an impact on insider trading incentives and, consequently, 
insider profits. The more equity insiders accumulate from compensation, the more likely they 
are to sell for liquidity and portfolio diversification reasons. Hence, we expect selling in such 
cases to be less driven by information and therefore to be less profitable. On the other hand, 
when insiders build up their equity holdings from remuneration grants, they are likely to 
purchase more equity on the open market only if they have a strong view about better 
prospects of the firm. Insider buying is in such a case more profitable. At the same time, less 
equity acquired through compensation may induce more buying to signal commitment and 
alignment of interests with outside shareholders which is less likely to be driven by specific 
favorable private information. Altogether, we expect a negative link between the profitability 
of insider selling and equity-linked compensation and a positive link for insider buying. As a 
proxy for the structure of compensation we use the mean ratio of equity based pay (stock and 
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option grants) to total compensation in a country, as reported by Fernandes et al. (2013).
22
 In 
our sample, it takes the values from 0.009 in Spain to 0.287 in Switzerland. 
6.1.7. Innovativeness 
Bartram et al. (2012) find that stocks in more innovative countries are more volatile 
and they argue that specific institutional or social factors in a country encourage firms to 
innovate and invest in growth opportunities. As a consequence, innovativeness creates more 
firm-specific information and generates information asymmetries between insiders and 
outsiders. We argue that in more innovative environments there are potential insider trading 
opportunities, and at the same time insiders are rewarded for innovating within firms through 
greater trading profits. We proxy for the country-level innovativeness with the gross domestic 
spending on Research and Development (R&D) as a percentage of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) available from the OECD Data website. For each country we average the 
annual measure over the 2008-2012 period. As reported in Table 8, the measure varies from 
0.006 in Latvia to 0.033 in Sweden. 
6.1.8. Religiosity 
Grullon et al. (2010) and Callen and Fang (2015), among others, provide evidence on 
the impact of religiosity on corporate behavior. They build on the psychology literature to 
argue that religiosity influences behavior and ethics and hence that decisions of executives 
differ depending on the religious norms of the environment in which they live and work. It is 
because the executive is more likely to be religious in a more religious environment but also 
even if the executive is not religious herself, she is likely to act differently under the pressure 
of social norms of the environment trying to avoid the social stigma. As a result, executives 
in firms located in more religious environments are less likely to make decisions that are 
controversial or that can be considered negative. 
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 For some of the sample countries we source the data from an earlier draft of Fernandes et al. (2013) which 
presents tests for a broader sample of countries. 
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Given that profitable insider trading can be considered as benefitting insiders at the 
expense of uninformed outside investors, we argue that insiders in more religious countries 
are less likely to trade profitably. We measure religiosity in a country using Gallup’s surveys 
in which respondents in 114 countries were asked a question on the importance of religion.
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Our variable is based on the percentage of respondents who answered that religion is an 
important part of their daily life. It varies from 0.16 in Estonia to 0.72 in Italy, with the 
sample mean of 0.37 (see Table 8). 
6.1.9. Trading Costs 
Seyhun (1986) provides the first evidence on the link between corporate insiders’ 
profits and trading costs. The argument builds on theoretical work by, among others, Glosten 
and Milgrom (1985) who present a model of adverse selection in financial markets in which 
the presence of informed traders leads market makers to increase spreads. Larger spreads 
allow market makers to offset losses they suffer in trades with well-informed insiders by 
gains from trading with uninformed traders. Despite the larger spreads, insiders are still able 
to make trading profits. However, on the one hand, profits to insider trading have to be larger 
in markets with wider spreads, as potential gains from trading on information with small 
value may not cover the higher trading costs. On the other hand, spreads in markets where 
insiders are active and trade profitably increase because of the adverse selection effects. 
Therefore, according to those arguments we expect to observe a positive relation between 
profits to insider trading and the average bid-ask spread in the country. We use effective 
spreads in our tests and we source them from Fong et al. (2017). The measure is based on 
percent effective spreads for all trades in a random sample of 30 stocks per country. 
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 http://www.gallup.com/poll/142727/religiosity-highest-world-poorest-nations.aspx 
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6.2. Empirical Evidence 
We explore the link between the profitability of insider trading and the factors 
discussed above in a series of cross-sectional regressions with the point estimates of insider 
α’s estimated over the 2008-2012 period (see Table 3) as the dependent variables. Similarly 
to Griffin et al. (2011), to prevent the degrees of freedom given our limited sample size we 
apply the following testing strategy. We start with a set of regressions with an intercept and a 
single independent variable of interest. Then, in the second step, we estimate regressions with 
a larger number of independent variables which are significant in the first step. All 
regressions are estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method with 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standards errors. 
Results of the regressions including one independent variable of interest are reported 
in Panel A of Table 9. Looking first at purchase transactions, the anti-self-dealing index 
measuring the overall investor protection is statistically significant for three out of four 
horizons, with a positive coefficient indicating that insiders’ realizable returns are larger in 
countries with stronger investor protection. The results are in line with the findings in Cziraki 
et al. (2014) and Fidrmuc et al. (2013) discussed above. Trading costs come significant at the 
10 percent level or better also for three holding horizons, and consistently with the theoretical 
predictions we find a positive link between insider returns and trading costs in the country. 
The coefficients of ownership concentration are all negative in line with the expectations 
discussed above but they are significant only for the two longest holding periods. We also 
find some evidence, with one coefficient significant at the 10 percent level or better across 
the four horizons, that insider buying is more profitable when MAD supervisory powers are 
larger.
24
 Buying is less profitable when insiders have to more timely report their trades, which 
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 As an alternative proxy for the prevalence of (undisclosed) insider trading, likely correlated with insider 
trading regulations, we use the average market reaction to public disclosures in a country from Griffin et al. 
(2011). Market reactions to public disclosure potentially capture a number of confounding factors but Griffin et 
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lends some support for the new E.U. regulations that shortened trade reporting deadline 
across the E.E.A. countries, and also in more religious environments. We do not find any 
statistically significant links between the profitability of insider buying and MAD 
enforcement, closed periods, equity compensation and innovativeness. 
In one-variable regressions for sale transactions, generally fewer variables are 
significant. There is only some evidence on the link between the profitability of insider 
selling and the MAD, with selling being less profitable (i.e. α’s being less negative) in 
countries in which MAD is more strictly implemented and enforced early. Overall the lack of 
statistically significant links between sales α’s and the range of factors considered confirms 
our earlier conclusion that sale transactions are more likely to be undertaken for liquidity and 
diversification reasons and hence are not linked with the regulatory, economic and cultural 
factors we analyze. Consistent with the liquidity and diversification motives for insider 
selling, as discussed above, we find positive coefficients (indicating lower profitability) of the 
equity compensation variable across all horizons but they are all statistically insignificant. 
In Panel B of Table 9 the regressions include all explanatory variables which are 
significant at the 10 percent level or better for the given transaction type and holding horizon 
in one-variable regressions reported in Panel A. When none or only one variable is significant 
in basic tests presented in Panel A, the relevant column in Panel B remains empty. The 
approach allows us to estimate if the variables identified as significant in one-variable 
regressions retain their significance when we control for other significant factors. The results 
and conclusions from the first step of the analysis presented above remain unchanged with 
two exceptions for purchase transactions. First, MAD supervisory powers lose their 
significance, and second, ownership concentration switches signs and once we control for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
al. (2011) show that they are most strongly related to insider trading. The regressions yield (results are not 
tabulated) a statistically significant positive coefficient (coeff 1.8753, p-value 0.088) for buys and the 130-day 
holding period, indicating that disclosed trades by corporate insiders are more profitable when undisclosed 
insider trading is less rampant. It confirms that corporate insiders compete with other informed traders. 
39 
 
other factors, the link between insider buying profits and ownership concentration becomes 
positive, contrary to the theoretical expectations. This indicates that the basic results for 
ownership concentration we find in Panel A of Table 9 are not robust and possibly suffer 
from the omitted variable problem. 
To summarize, the cross-sectional results reveal that, overall, the profitability of 
insider buying is higher in countries with better investor protection, which suggests a 
supplementary role of insider trading profits when expropriation of outsiders through other 
channels is limited, or a higher informational role of insiders’ signals in better investor 
protection environments. Profitable buying is also positively linked with trading costs. The 
profitability of buying in the mid-term (130 trading days) is also lower in more religious 
countries, where insiders feel more constrained to act in a way that can be seen controversial, 
and insider profits are also lower when insiders have to report their transactions more 
promptly which limits the scope for strategic trading and trade reporting. Furthermore, the 
profitability of insider selling over the longer horizon (260 trading days) is lower in countries 
with more stringent and better enforced insider trading rules. Overall, in our limited sample 
size the results can be treated only as indicative and exploratory, but nevertheless we shed 
some light on structural differences between countries to show that various regulatory, 
economic and cultural factors have a potential to explain why the profits to insider trading 
differ so much across countries. 
Because α, our dependent variable, is not directly observed but estimated in a 
regression, as a robustness check we run alternative Weighted Least Squares (WLS) 
estimations of the cross-sectional models, with weights equal to the inverse of the α’s 
standard errors. Such an approach gives a higher weight to observations with more precisely 
estimated insider returns. The (untabulated) results and hence conclusions of the multivariate 
regressions analysis presented in Panel B of Table 9 remain very similar. The only difference 
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is that both MAD-related variables for sales over the 260-day horizon lose their 
significance.
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7. Conclusions 
In this paper we ask a question of whether corporate insiders in 18 countries across 
Europe profit from trading in own firms’ shares. Specifically, we test if portfolios that closely 
mimic reported insiders’ purchase or sale transactions beat the respective stock market. Given 
the evidence of profitable corporate insider trading in the U.S. reported in the earlier 
literature, our results are somewhat surprising. We find that portfolios mimicking insider 
purchases generate statistically significant profits in few European countries, at least over the 
assumed hypothetical holding periods, and selling is largely unprofitable. Our conclusions are 
robust to the choice of the estimation method, sample period and sample composition. 
Our further results demonstrate that there are no subsamples of firms with particular 
characteristics that would consistently offer significant returns. Therefore, we can conclude 
that the low profitability found in the broad sample also holds across subsamples. We then 
turn to the impact of the E.U. Market Abuse Directive on reported insider trading and find a 
mixed picture of significant changes in the number and/or volume of transactions, but no 
evidence of any systematic shift in the profitability of insider portfolios after the MAD was 
translated into local laws.  
We also test whether insider profitability across countries is systematically linked 
with specific country-level regulatory, economic or cultural factors. We find some evidence 
that profits to insider portfolios are linked with the level of investor protection, trading costs, 
religiosity, trade reporting deadlines and the strictness and enforcement of insider trading 
rules in the country. Overall, our results indicate that given the inherent structural differences 
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 The results are untabulated to save space but are available from the authors upon request. 
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between countries across many dimensions, insider trading profits are likely to differ starkly 
across countries and insights on insider trading profitability in one country are not easily 
transferrable to other countries. 
This study offers implications for policymakers and practitioners. First, our results 
show that regulators in Europe should not be concerned with the reported everyday trading by 
corporate insiders, as we find that they tend not to trade on economically valuable 
information. Second, the low profitability of insider trading we document indicates that 
reported share transactions by corporate insiders in Europe have limited usefulness for 
developing profitable trading strategies by outside investors. We show that at least a simple 
trading strategy mimicking all insider transactions is unlikely to systematically yield positive 
returns. 
Further research could explore in detail the characteristics of insider portfolios in 
smaller countries where fewer insiders trade and hence the insider-mimicking portfolios 
contain fewer stocks and their composition can change considerably over time. To confirm 
robustness of our findings we offer a few different returns-based portfolio performance 
evaluation approaches, but further light on insider performance can be shed using an 
alternative portfolio holdings-based performance evaluation and attribution method (see 
Wermers (2006) for a review). 
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Appendix A. Full baseline results for insider purchase portfolios 
 
The table reports performance evaluation results for insider purchase portfolios applying the CAPM model 
presented in equation (1). The portfolios consist of all shares purchased by insiders in a given country in open 
market transactions and held for the specified period. The sample period is 2008-2012. Details of the sample are 
presented in Table 2. 
***
, 
**
 and 
*
 denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Holding 
period 
α RMRF  
Number of 
observations 
Months 
with empty 
portfolios  coeff (p-val) coeff (p-val) R-sq 
Belgium 20 days 0.0214* (0.072) 1.0999*** (0.000) 0.451  59  0 
 65 days 0.0156* (0.058) 0.7977*** (0.000) 0.497  57  0 
 130 days 0.0094* (0.080) 0.7616*** (0.000) 0.665  54  0 
 260 days 0.0027 (0.495) 0.8511*** (0.000) 0.688  48  0 
Czech Rep 20 days 0.0015 (0.903) 0.9393*** (0.000) 0.293  59  9 
 65 days 0.0169 (0.191) 0.9760*** (0.000) 0.298  57  0 
 130 days 0.0153 (0.228) 0.8670*** (0.000) 0.270  54  0 
 260 days 0.0100 (0.410) 1.2414*** (0.000) 0.412  48  0 
Denmark 20 days -0.0072 (0.595) 1.2241*** (0.000) 0.369  59  0 
 65 days -0.0020 (0.879) 1.1221*** (0.000) 0.365  57  0 
 130 days 0.0005 (0.967) 0.7609*** (0.000) 0.254  54  0 
 260 days 0.0013 (0.896) 0.6731*** (0.000) 0.246  48  0 
Estonia 20 days -0.0079 (0.493) 0.5776*** (0.000) 0.369  59  6 
 65 days 0.0021 (0.887) 0.8498*** (0.000) 0.454  57  2 
 130 days 0.0179 (0.297) 0.9561*** (0.000) 0.463  54  0 
 260 days 0.0068 (0.573) 0.6982*** (0.000) 0.466  48  0 
France 20 days 0.0094* (0.083) 1.0115*** (0.000) 0.675  59  0 
 65 days -0.0006 (0.902) 1.0582*** (0.000) 0.718  57  0 
 130 days -0.0001 (0.983) 1.0306*** (0.000) 0.783  54  0 
 260 days 0.0050 (0.235) 0.9996*** (0.000) 0.789  48  0 
Germany 20 days 0.0273*** (0.004) 0.9195*** (0.000) 0.437  59  0 
 65 days 0.0028 (0.726) 1.0172*** (0.000) 0.564  57  0 
 130 days 0.0045 (0.473) 0.9138*** (0.000) 0.642  54  0 
 260 days 0.0070* (0.087) 0.7452*** (0.000) 0.749  48  0 
Greece 20 days 0.0233* (0.072) 0.5337*** (0.000) 0.312  59  0 
 65 days 0.0039 (0.627) 0.5229*** (0.000) 0.544  57  0 
 130 days -0.0084 (0.242) 0.4002*** (0.000) 0.481  54  0 
 260 days -0.0099 (0.336) 0.4648*** (0.000) 0.398  48  0 
Iceland 20 days -0.0011 (0.881) 0.5870*** (0.000) 0.657  59  23 
 65 days -0.0077 (0.550) 0.6527*** (0.000) 0.424  57  9 
 130 days -0.0134 (0.407) 0.7852*** (0.000) 0.430  54  0 
 260 days 0.0042 (0.272) 0.6086*** (0.000) 0.658  48  0 
Ireland 20 days 0.0350* (0.095) 0.6465** (0.012) 0.105  59  2 
 65 days 0.0150 (0.369) 0.8091*** (0.000) 0.233  57  0 
 130 days 0.0145 (0.345) 0.7028*** (0.000) 0.217  54  0 
 260 days 0.0171 (0.276) 0.6612*** (0.008) 0.141  48  0 
(continued) 
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Appendix A. - continued 
 
 
Holding 
period 
α RMRF  
Number of 
observations 
Months 
with empty 
portfolios  Coeff (p-val) coeff (p-val) R-sq 
Italy 20 days 0.0034 (0.562) 0.5406*** (0.000) 0.437  59  0 
 65 days -0.0103** (0.032) 0.6394*** (0.000) 0.635  57  0 
 130 days -0.0070 (0.146) 0.7233*** (0.000) 0.693  54  0 
 260 days -0.0007 (0.989) 0.8101*** (0.000) 0.688  48  0 
Latvia 20 days 0.0068 (0.613) 0.5662*** (0.003) 0.143  59  29 
 65 days 0.0224 (0.169) 0.6225*** (0.007) 0.126  57  16 
 130 days 0.0048 (0.742) 0.6404*** (0.002) 0.171  54  9 
 260 days 0.0123 (0.388) 0.8485*** (0.000) 0.236  48  1 
Lithuania 20 days 0.0013 (0.909) 0.9442*** (0.000) 0.563  59  5 
 65 days 0.0095 (0.469) 0.7339*** (0.000) 0.368  57  1 
 130 days 0.0069 (0.580) 0.9066*** (0.000) 0.521  54  0 
 260 days 0.0022 (0.754) 0.8188*** (0.000) 0.699  48  0 
Netherlands 20 days 0.0021 (0.872) 0.8516*** (0.000) 0.216  59  0 
 65 days -0.0093 (0.383) 0.8387*** (0.000) 0.302  57  0 
 130 days -0.0123 (0.272) 0.6356*** (0.001) 0.185  54  0 
 260 days -0.0016 (0.897) 0.7737*** (0.002) 0.194  48  0 
Norway 20 days 0.0264** (0.029) 0.6412*** (0.000) 0.231  59  0 
 65 days 0.0099 (0.267) 0.5913*** (0.000) 0.324  57  0 
 130 days 0.0055 (0.449) 0.5180*** (0.000) 0.357  54  0 
 260 days 0.0089* (0.053) 0.5871*** (0.000) 0.550  48  0 
Spain 20 days 0.0015 (0.863) 0.8034*** (0.000) 0.444  59  0 
 65 days 0.0000 (0.998) 0.7511*** (0.000) 0.507  57  0 
 130 days -0.0063 (0.353) 0.8265*** (0.000) 0.613  54  0 
 260 days -0.0071 (0.341) 0.9214*** (0.000) 0.644  48  0 
Sweden 20 days 0.0018 (0.790) 0.6236*** (0.000) 0.360  59  0 
 65 days 0.0049 (0.350) 0.6528*** (0.000) 0.531  57  0 
 130 days 0.0029 (0.534) 0.8064*** (0.000) 0.681  54  0 
 260 days 0.0055 (0.109) 0.8349*** (0.000) 0.807  48  0 
Switzerland 20 days -0.0013 (0.866) 0.8168*** (0.000) 0.246  59  0 
 65 days -0.0095 (0.176) 1.0457*** (0.000) 0.426  57  0 
 130 days -0.0055 (0.512) 1.2408*** (0.000) 0.424  54  0 
 260 days 0.0065 (0.390) 1.2715*** (0.000) 0.487  48  0 
U.K. 20 days 0.0371*** (0.004) 0.9516*** (0.001) 0.192  59  0 
 65 days 0.0168 (0.116) 1.2905*** (0.000) 0.401  57  0 
 130 days 0.0085 (0.311) 1.4540*** (0.000) 0.582  54  0 
 260 days 0.0039 (0.543) 1.4016*** (0.000) 0.669  48  0 
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Appendix B. Full baseline results for insider sale portfolios 
 
The table reports performance evaluation results for insider sale portfolios applying the CAPM model presented 
in equation (1). The portfolios consist of all shares sold by insiders in a given country in open market 
transactions and held for the specified period. The sample period is 2008-2012. Details of the sample are 
presented in Table 2. 
***
, 
**
 and 
*
 denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Holding 
period 
α RMRF  
Number of 
observations 
Months 
with empty 
portfolios  coeff (p-val) coeff (p-val) R-sq 
Belgium 20 days 0.0148* (0.070) 0.3629*** (0.002) 0.161  59  0 
 65 days 0.0144*** (0.006) 0.4306*** (0.000) 0.427  57  0 
 130 days 0.0156*** (0.000) 0.5369*** (0.000) 0.693  54  0 
 260 days 0.0084** (0.018) 0.6425*** (0.000) 0.620  48  0 
Czech Rep 20 days -0.0093 (0.223) 0.4913*** (0.000) 0.225  59  19 
 65 days -0.0076 (0.327) 0.5963*** (0.000) 0.307  57  7 
 130 days -0.0100 (0.215) 0.7501*** (0.000) 0.405  54  2 
 260 days -0.0034 (0.559) 0.4328*** (0.000) 0.271  48  0 
Denmark 20 days -0.0153 (0.139) 0.7918*** (0.000) 0.298  59  0 
 65 days -0.0083 (0.391) 0.7324*** (0.000) 0.301  57  0 
 130 days -0.0140* (0.097) 0.8375*** (0.000) 0.450  54  0 
 260 days -0.0144** (0.037) 0.6440*** (0.000) 0.385  48  0 
Estonia 20 days -0.0073 (0.664) 0.3838** (0.011) 0.108  59  16 
 65 days -0.0046 (0.807) 0.7705*** (0.000) 0.290  57  7 
 130 days 0.0307 (0.180) 1.2147*** (0.000) 0.440  54  4 
 260 days 0.0102 (0.573) 1.0235*** (0.000) 0.459  48  0 
France 20 days 0.0009 (0.837) 0.8886*** (0.000) 0.707  59  0 
 65 days 0.0026 (0.561) 0.8720*** (0.000) 0.708  57  0 
 130 days -0.0029 (0.481) 0.9047*** (0.000) 0.760  54  0 
 260 days 0.0020 (0.492) 0.8234*** (0.000) 0.843  48  0 
Germany 20 days -0.0044 (0.716) 0.4641** (0.015) 0.100  59  0 
 65 days 0.0058 (0.472) 0.5953*** (0.000) 0.300  57  0 
 130 days 0.0004 (0.949) 0.7185*** (0.000) 0.472  54  0 
 260 days 0.0051 (0.233) 0.4764*** (0.000) 0.519  48  0 
Greece 20 days -0.0018 (0.902) 0.7254*** (0.000) 0.393  59  0 
 65 days 0.0012 (0.935) 0.6744*** (0.000) 0.371  57  0 
 130 days -0.0125 (0.196) 0.5268*** (0.000) 0.469  54  0 
 260 days -0.0050 (0.539) 0.5764*** (0.000) 0.617  48  0 
Iceland 20 days -0.0089 (0.321) 0.8660*** (0.000) 0.721  59  31 
 65 days 0.0001 (0.989) 0.9075*** (0.000) 0.833  57  14 
 130 days -0.0020 (0.786) 0.5447*** (0.000) 0.639  54  3 
 260 days 0.0110** (0.044) 0.4927*** (0.000) 0.393  48  0 
Ireland 20 days 0.0145 (0.105) 0.6099*** (0.000) 0.362  59  5 
 65 days 0.0064 (0.513) 0.5888*** (0.000) 0.317  57  0 
 130 days 0.0111 (0.169) 0.5683*** (0.000) 0.400  54  0 
 260 days 0.0025 (0.704) 0.5777*** (0.000) 0.411  48  0 
(continued) 
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Appendix B. - continued 
 
 
Holding 
period 
α RMRF  
Number of 
observations 
Months 
with empty 
portfolios  coeff (p-val) coeff (p-val) R-sq 
Italy 20 days -0.0109 (0.302) 0.6253*** (0.000) 0.241  59  0 
 65 days -0.0059 (0.374) 0.5736*** (0.000) 0.417  57  0 
 130 days 0.0007 (0.912) 0.5859*** (0.000) 0.470  54  0 
 260 days 0.0062 (0.127) 0.4200*** (0.000) 0.537  48  0 
Latvia 20 days -0.0053 (0.492) 0.4024*** (0.000) 0.204  59  47 
 65 days -0.0095 (0.447) 0.9269*** (0.000) 0.351  57  33 
 130 days 0.0022 (0.897) 1.5658*** (0.000) 0.487  54  21 
 260 days 0.0218 (0.316) 1.5383*** (0.000) 0.306  48  7 
Lithuania 20 days -0.0094 (0.387) 0.3331*** (0.003) 0.143  59  21 
 65 days -0.0176 (0.174) 0.8286*** (0.000) 0.433  57  6 
 130 days -0.0198 (0.126) 0.7956*** (0.000) 0.441  54  1 
 260 days 0.0069 (0.555) 0.6739*** (0.000) 0.367  48  0 
Netherlands 20 days 0.0106 (0.228) 0.5215*** (0.001) 0.188  59  0 
 65 days 0.0044 (0.489) 0.6998*** (0.000) 0.459  57  0 
 130 days 0.0087 (0.119) 0.5364*** (0.000) 0.392  54  0 
 260 days 0.0023 (0.628) 0.5419*** (0.000) 0.433  48  0 
Norway 20 days -0.0233* (0.070) 0.6078*** (0.001) 0.191  59  0 
 65 days -0.0174** (0.020) 0.7099*** (0.000) 0.506  57  0 
 130 days -0.0032 (0.552) 0.6432*** (0.000) 0.616  54  0 
 260 days 0.0041 (0.460) 0.4885*** (0.000) 0.358  48  0 
Spain 20 days -0.0031 (0.705) 0.8607*** (0.000) 0.506  59  0 
 65 days -0.0027 (0.667) 0.7725*** (0.000) 0.601  57  0 
 130 days -0.0080 (0.135) 0.7841*** (0.000) 0.696  54  0 
 260 days -0.0075 (0.161) 0.8315*** (0.000) 0.741  48  0 
Sweden 20 days -0.0099 (0.166) 0.9777*** (0.000) 0.566  59  0 
 65 days -0.0091 (0.198) 0.7314*** (0.000) 0.446  57  0 
 130 days -0.0054 (0.273) 0.5982*** (0.000) 0.522  54  0 
 260 days 0.0028 (0.509) 0.5639*** (0.000) 0.543  48  0 
Switzerland 20 days 0.0077 (0.522) 1.2652*** (0.000) 0.259  59  0 
 65 days 0.0039 (0.419) 1.0390*** (0.000) 0.610  57  0 
 130 days 0.0060 (0.113) 0.9899*** (0.000) 0.702  54  0 
 260 days 0.0050 (0.193) 0.8899*** (0.000) 0.6470  48  0 
U.K. 20 days 0.0016 (0.781) 0.9106*** (0.000) 0.523  59  0 
 65 days -0.0006 (0.886) 0.9247*** (0.000) 0.649  57  0 
 130 days 0.0001 (0.976) 0.9768*** (0.000) 0.661  54  0 
 260 days 0.0094** (0.012) 0.7964*** (0.000) 0.678  48  0 
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Table 1. Regulations of transactions by corporate insiders 
 
The table summarizes key regulations of trading and reporting of trading by corporate insiders. The regulations were in place at the end of the sample period (December 
2012) and were driven by the E.U. Market Abuse Directive (MAD). The MAD was replaced in 2016 by the new E.U. Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) which changed the 
reporting deadlines and introduced closed periods throughout the E.U. countries. 
 
Country Reporting deadline Exclusions Closed periods 
Belgium 5 working days Trades with aggregate value of less than EUR 
5,000 in a calendar year 
None 
Czech Rep 5 working days None None 
Denmark 2 working days Trades with aggregate value of less than EUR 
5,000 in a calendar year 
Each issuer’s internal rules shall contain a period within which directors are permitted to 
trade. The maximum length of this period is six weeks after each published interim report 
or preliminary announcement of annual results. 
Estonia 5 working days None From 1 week before the end of the reporting period and ending 1 day after the disclosure of 
the financial results. 
France 5 working days Trades with aggregate value of less than EUR 
5,000 in a calendar year 
Directors are not allowed to trade within a period of 15 days preceding the publication of 
annual, half yearly or quarterly reports. 
Germany 5 working days Trades with aggregate value of less than EUR 
5,000 in a calendar year 
None 
Greece 4 working days Trades with aggregate value of less than EUR 
5,000 in a calendar year 
None 
Iceland 1 working day. Trades by 
management should be 
made public immediately. 
None None. Designation of closed periods is recommended by the regulator. 
Ireland 5 working days Trades with aggregate value of less than EUR 
5,000 in a calendar year 
60 days immediately preceding the preliminary announcement of the full year results and 
the publication of the half yearly results. 30 days immediately preceding publication of 
quarterly results. 
Italy 5 working days Trades with aggregate value of less than EUR 
5,000 in a calendar year 
None but many listed companies have adopted on a discretionary basis specific rules on 
internal dealing specifying blackout periods. 
Latvia 4 working days Trades with aggregate value of less than EUR 
5,000 in a calendar year 
None 
Lithuania 5 working days None None 
(continued) 
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Table 1. - continued 
 
Country Reporting deadline Exclusions Closed periods 
Netherlands 5 working days. The CEO 
and MD must make 
immediate disclosures. 
Trades with aggregate value of less than EUR 
5,000 in a calendar year 
Each issuer must define its own close periods but there is no set length of time which they 
must adhere to. 
Norway 1 working day None None 
Spain 4 working days None None 
Sweden 5 working days Companies listed on First North Exchange For 30 days before an earnings report is announced. 
Switzerland 2 working days Transactions that total less than CHF 100,000 
in a calendar month are not made public by SIX 
Swiss Exchange 
None, however insiders are advised to abstain from trading for 20 days prior to earnings 
announcements 
U.K. 4 working days None The shorter of the end of the year to disclosure date or 60 days before disclosure of the 
annual report and preliminary announcement of annual results. From the end of the 
reporting period to the date the semi-annual report is disclosed. The shorter of the end of 
the year to disclosure date or 30 days before disclosure of the quarterly report. 
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Table 2. Data coverage 
 
The data set includes open market share purchase and sale transactions reported by corporate insiders. The data are obtained from Directors Deals Ltd. 
 
Country From To 
Number 
of months 
Total 
number 
of purchases 
Total 
number 
of sales 
Avg number 
of purchases 
per month 
Avg number 
of sales 
per month 
Total 
volume 
of purchases 
(million) 
Total 
volume 
of sales 
(million) 
Avg volume 
of purchases 
per month 
(million) 
Avg volume 
of sales 
per month 
(million) 
Belgium May-06 Dec-12 80 1,588 1,608 19.9 20.1 46.53 119.59 0.58 1.49 
Czech Rep Jan-05 Dec-12 96 238 223 2.5 2.3 3.63 11.32 0.04 0.12 
Denmark Jan-07 Dec-12 72 2,090 856 29.0 11.9 173.42 176.52 2.41 2.45 
Estonia Jan-05 Dec-12 96 256 181 2.7 1.9 37.16 115.71 0.39 1.21 
France Apr-06 Dec-12 81 9,943 8,164 122.8 100.8 597.25 818.70 7.37 10.11 
Germany Jul-02 Dec-12 126 10,158 6,514 80.6 51.7 403.36 832.61 3.20 6.61 
Greece Jan-08 Dec-12 60 12,815 1,833 213.6 30.6 1,154.56 560.08 19.24 9.33 
Iceland Jan-07 Dec-12 72 201 141 2.8 2.0 8,196.74 20,336.50 113.84 282.45 
Ireland Jan-99 Dec-12 168 603 456 3.6 2.7 274.86 139.34 1.64 0.83 
Italy Jan-03 Dec-12 120 10,450 6,715 87.1 56.0 1,849.22 3,668.54 15.41 30.57 
Latvia Jun-07 Dec-12 67 67 32 1.0 0.5 14.33 2.09 0.21 0.03 
Lithuania Jan-07 Dec-12 72 320 81 4.4 1.1 24.39 11.08 0.34 0.15 
Netherlands Apr-99 Dec-12 165 1,944 3,383 11.8 20.5 609.21 167.92 3.69 1.02 
Norway Jan-07 Dec-12 72 4,247 1,695 59.0 23.5 777.90 967.01 10.80 13.43 
Spain Sep-06 Dec-12 76 3,362 1,138 44.2 15.0 535.17 545.84 7.04 7.18 
Sweden Jan-07 Dec-12 72 8,433 4,112 117.1 57.1 1,096.77 1,597.85 15.23 22.19 
Switzerland Feb-07 Dec-12 71 4,438 5,323 62.5 75.0 99.73 233.66 1.40 3.29 
U.K. Jan-99 Dec-12 168 28,177 25,019 167.7 148.9 3,131.83 7,077.10 18.64 42.13 
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Table 3. α’s of insider portfolios in 18 European countries, common sample period (2008-
2012) 
 
The table summarises the results of the performance evaluation analysis for insider purchase and sale portfolios. 
The performance is measured as α from the CAPM model presented in equation (1). The portfolios consist of all 
shares purchased or sold by insiders in a given country in open market transactions and held for the specified 
period. Details of the sample are presented in Table 2. 
 
Holding period 
Zero 
(insignificant) 
Positive 
(p-value < 0.05) 
Negative 
(p-value < 0.05) Mean Median 
Panel A. Purchases 
20 days  15  3  0 0.0101 0.0027 
65 days  17  0  1 0.0045 0.0033 
130 days  18  0  0 0.0021 0.0037 
260 days  18  0  0 0.0041 0.0046 
Panel B. Sales 
20 days  18  0  0 -0.0033 -0.0048 
65 days  16  1  1 -0.0025 -0.0017 
130 days  17  1  0 -0.0001 -0.0009 
260 days  14  3  1 0.0037 0.0045 
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Table 4. α’s of insider portfolios, alternative estimation methods 
 
The table summarises the results of the performance evaluation analysis for insider purchase (Panel A) and sale 
(Panel B) portfolios for alternative estimation methods. The performance is measured as α from the CAPM 
model presented in equation (1), unless stated otherwise. The portfolios consist of all shares purchased or sold 
by insiders in a given country in open market transactions and held for the specified period. Panels A1 and B1 
report results on α’s from a version of model (1) where the slope coefficient is set to one. Panels A2 and B2 
contain results from model (2), i.e., a version of model (1) where the lagged excess market return is added as an 
explanatory variable. Panels A3 and B3 summarize results on model (1) α’s obtained from a reduced sample, 
containing only those 12 countries with the largest number of listed firms. Results in Panels A4 and B4 are for 
the four-factor model presented in equation (3). Results in Panels A5 and B5 are from model (1) estimated for 
the post-crisis 2009-2012 period while the results in Panels A6 and B6 are for the full available sample period 
for each country, with the sample period varying across countries. Unless stated otherwise, the sample period is 
2008-2012. Details of the sample are presented in Table 2. 
(continued) 
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Table 4. - continued 
 
Holding period 
Zero 
(insignificant) 
Positive 
(p-value < 0.05) 
Negative 
(p-value < 0.05) Mean Median 
Panel A. Purchases 
A1. CAPM with  set to one 
20 days  14  4  0 0.0118 0.0080 
65 days  18  0  0 0.0061 0.0029 
130 days  18  0  0 0.0037 0.0053 
260 days  18  0  0 0.0032 0.0036 
A2. CAPM regression with lagged excess market return 
20 days  14  4  0 0.0109 0.0035 
65 days  17  0  1 0.0059 0.0051 
130 days  18  0  0 0.0035 0.0036 
260 days  18  0  0 0.0030 0.0044 
A3. 12 countries with the largest number of listed firms 
20 days  9  3  0 0.0121 0.0064 
65 days  11  0  1 0.0018 0.0014 
130 days  12  0  0 -0.0007 0.0002 
260 days  12  0  0 0.0018 0.0033 
A4. Four-factor model 
20 days  9  4  0 0.0154 0.0097 
65 days  10  2  1 0.0046 0.0019 
130 days  12  1  0 0.0021 0.0029 
260 days  11  2  0 0.0038 0.0044 
A5. Post-crisis 2009-2012 period 
20 days  13  5  0 0.0136 0.0066 
65 days  17  1  0 0.0089 0.0083 
130 days  17  1  0 0.0052 0.0059 
260 days  17  1  0 0.0023 0.0030 
A6. Maximum window available for each country 
20 days  13  5  0 0.0103 0.0067 
65 days  16  2  0 0.0056 0.0048 
130 days  16  2  0 0.0037 0.0035 
260 days  17  1  0 0.0004 0.0005 
(continued) 
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Table 4. - continued 
 
Holding period 
Zero 
(insignificant) 
Positive 
(p-value < 0.05) 
Negative 
(p-value < 0.05) Mean Median 
Panel B. Sales 
B1. CAPM with  set to one 
20 days  17  1  0 -0.0022 -0.0039 
65 days  16  1  1 -0.0016 -0.0016 
130 days  17  1  0 0.0013 -0.0002 
260 days  16  1  1 0.0021 0.0016 
B2. CAPM regression with lagged excess market return 
20 days  18  0  0 -0.0028 -0.0043 
65 days  16  1  1 -0.0023 -0.0021 
130 days  17  1  0 -0.0000 -0.0015 
260 days  15  2  1 0.0029 0.0029 
B3. 12 countries with the largest number of listed firms 
20 days  12  0  0 -0.0028 -0.0024 
65 days  10  1  1 -0.0010 0.0003 
130 days  11  1  0 -0.0012 -0.0014 
260 days  9  2  1 0.0015 0.0035 
B4. Four-factor model 
20 days  12  1  0 0.0000 -0.0013 
65 days  11  1  1 0.0004 -0.0014 
130 days  12  1  0 0.0000 -0.0009 
260 days  10  3  0 0.0017 0.0045 
B5. Post-crisis 2009-2012 period 
20 days  18  0  0 0.0011 -0.0013 
65 days  17  1  0 0.0012 0.0015 
130 days  17  1  0 0.0006 0.0022 
260 days  18  0  0 0.0009 0.0026 
B6. Maximum window available for each country 
20 days  16  2  0 -0.0013 -0.0019 
65 days  16  2  0 -0.0012 -0.0012 
130 days  14  3  1 -0.0011 -0.0011 
260 days  15  1  2 -0.0004 0.0007 
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Table 5. α’s of insider portfolios across firm categories 
 
The table summarises the results of the performance evaluation analysis for insider purchase (Panel A) and sale 
(Panel B) portfolios for alternative firm categories over the 2008-2012 period. The performance is measured as 
α from the CAPM model presented in equation (1). The portfolios consist of all shares purchased or sold by 
insiders in a given country in open market transactions and held for the specified period. Panels A1 and B1 
report results for firms with different market capitalization, Panels A2 and B2 display results for firms with and 
without analyst coverage, Panels A3 and B3 show results for high tech versus non high tech firms, and Panels 
A4 and B4 summarize results for firms with high versus low levels of closely held shares. Differences between 
categories are measured using paired tests and the p-values of the tests are reported in parentheses.
 **
 and 
*
 
denote statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The sample includes 12 largest countries 
selected from the full sample presented in Table 2. 
 
 
Holding 
period 
Zero 
(insignificant) 
Positive 
(p-value < 0.05) 
Negative 
(p-value < 0.05) Mean Median 
Panel A. Purchases 
A1. Market capitalization 
Large 20 days  8  4  0 0.0088 0.0080 
 260 days  12  0  0 0.0028 0.0044 
Small 20 days  8  4  0 0.0151 0.0138 
 260 days  12  0  0 0.0012 0.0007 
Diff (p-value) 20 days    (0.307) (0.470) 
 260 days    (0.567) (0.519) 
A2. Analyst coverage 
> 0 20 days  9  3  0 0.0113 0.0084 
 260 days  12  0  0 0.0029 0.0042 
0 20 days  9  2  1 0.0110 0.0120 
 260 days  11  0  1 0.0008 0.0061 
Diff (p-value) 20 days    (0.965) (0.850) 
 260 days    (0.609) (0.733) 
A3. Industry 
High tech 20 days  12  0  0 0.0028 0.0018 
 260 days  10  2  0 0.0098 0.0128 
Other 20 days  10  2  0 0.0137 0.0161 
 260 days  11  1  0 -0.0000 0.0004 
Diff (p-value) 20 days    (0.025)
 **
 (0.034)
 **
 
 260 days    (0.130) (0.233) 
A4. Closely held shares 
High 20 days  9  3  0 0.0122 0.0081 
 260 days  10  2  0 0.0012 0.0033 
Low 20 days  10  2  0 0.0136 0.0087 
 260 days  12  0  0 0.0028 0.0027 
Diff (p-value) 20 days    (0.688) (0.677) 
 260 days    (0.533) (0.733) 
(continued) 
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Table 5. - continued 
 
 
Holding 
period 
Zero 
(insignificant) 
Positive 
(p-value < 0.05) 
Negative 
(p-value < 0.05) Mean Median 
Panel A. Sales 
B1. Market capitalization 
Large 20 days  12  0  0 -0.0022 0.0004 
 260 days  9  3  0 0.0034 0.0048 
Small 20 days  10  0  2 -0.0067 -0.0076 
 260 days  8  1  3 -0.0050 -0.0042 
Diff (p-value) 20 days    (0.436) (0.470) 
 260 days    (0.058)
 *
 (0.043)
 **
 
B2. Analyst coverage 
> 0 20 days  10  0  2 -0.0011 -0.0003 
 260 days  9  3  0 0.0032 0.0040 
0 20 days  11  0  1 -0.0010 -0.0003 
 260 days  10  1  1 0.0006 0.0039 
Diff (p-value) 20 days    (0.985) (0.970) 
 260 days    (0.605) (0.733) 
B3. Industry 
High tech 20 days  10  1  1 -0.0018 -0.0006 
 260 days  10  2  0 0.0091 0.0077 
Other 20 days  11  0  1 0.0020 0.0005 
 260 days  10  2  0 0.0022 0.0006 
Diff (p-value) 20 days    (0.273) (0.092)
 *
 
 260 days    (0.140) (0.204) 
B4. Closely held shares 
High 20 days  11  0  1 -0.0033 0.0001 
 260 days  9  2  1 0.0028 0.0058 
Low 20 days  12  0  0 -0.0027 -0.0005 
 260 days  11  1  0 0.0014 0.0026 
Diff (p-value) 20 days    (0.884) (0.850) 
 260 days    (0.592) (0.677) 
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Table 6. Insider trading before and after MAD implementation 
 
This table provides information on insider trading activity before and after the E.U. Market Abuse Directive 
(MAD) was implemented in the national law in a given country. The Pre-MAD period starts in January 2003 
and runs until the last month before the MAD was implemented. The Post-MAD period starts in the MAD 
implementation month and runs until December 2012. p-values of the test for differences in means are reported 
in parentheses. 
***
, 
**
 and 
*
 denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The data 
on insider trades are obtained from Directors Deals Ltd, and the data on MAD implementation dates (in 
parentheses) are from Christensen et al. (2016). 
 
Country (MAD 
implementation date) Period 
Avg number 
of purchases 
per month 
Avg number 
of sales 
per month 
Avg volume 
of purchases 
per month 
(million) 
Avg volume 
of sales 
per month 
(million) 
Germany (Oct-04) Pre-MAD 39.6 51.0 2.25 4.41 
 Post-MAD 88.9 52.9 3.34 7.09 
 Diff (p-value) (0.000) *** (0.787) (0.232) (0.021) ** 
Ireland (Jul-05) Pre-MAD 2.5 1.7 0.24 1.96 
 Post-MAD 5.1 4.5 3.33 0.99 
 Diff (p-value) (0.001) *** (0.000) *** (0.133) (0.099) * 
Italy (May-05) Pre-MAD 32.3 51.8 7.86 8.72 
 Post-MAD 103.8 57.2 17.71 37.22 
 Diff (p-value) (0.000) *** (0.471) (0.006) *** (0.002) *** 
Netherlands (Oct-05) Pre-MAD 7.5 20.0 4.27 0.44 
 Post-MAD 13.6 19.9 5.03 1.60 
 Diff (p-value) (0.000) *** (0.977) (0.848) (0.021) ** 
U.K. (Jul-05) Pre-MAD 150.1 116.0 12.11 54.87 
 Post-MAD 156.7 195.9 22.85 49.37 
 Diff (p-value) (0.645) (0.000) *** (0.001) *** (0.773) 
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Table 7. The impact of MAD implementation on insider trading α’s – time series evidence 
 
This table presents the results of the performance evaluation analysis for insider purchase (Panel A) and sale 
(Panel B) portfolios over the 2003-2012 period. The performance is measured as α from the model presented in 
equation (4). ‘MAD’ refers to the coefficient on the MAD dummy in model (4), with the variable being equal to 
zero before and to one after the MAD was implemented into the national law in a given country. ‘RMRF’ refers 
to the coefficient on excess market return in model (4).
 ***
, 
**
 and 
*
 denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Holding 
period 
α MAD RMRF  
 coeff (p-val) coeff (p-val) coeff (p-val) R-sq 
Panel A. Purchases 
Germany 20 days 0.0232 (0.153) -0.0026 (0.882) 0.9226
***
 (0.000) 0.367 
 260 days 0.0116 (0.399) -0.0085 (0.552) 0.9297
***
 (0.000) 0.612 
Ireland 20 days -0.0198 (0.407) 0.0477
*
 (0.086) 0.6540
***
 (0.000) 0.110 
 260 days -0.0355
*
 (0.099) 0.0453
*
 (0.057) 0.8391
***
 (0.000) 0.288 
Italy 20 days 0.0055 (0.516) 0.0013 (0.893) 0.6484
***
 (0.000) 0.422 
 260 days 0.0011 (0.901) 0.0002 (0.983) 0.8151
***
 (0.000) 0.661 
Netherlands 20 days 0.0435
**
 (0.014) -0.0334 (0.104) 0.7984
***
 (0.000) 0.177 
 260 days -0.0030 (0.842) 0.0033 (0.841) 0.7143
***
 (0.000) 0.231 
U.K. 20 days 0.0313
**
 (0.022) -0.0010 (0.950) 0.9464
***
 (0.000) 0.215 
 260 days 0.0062 (0.512) -0.0030 (0.774) 1.2278
***
 (0.000) 0.609 
Panel B. Sales 
Germany 20 days 0.0077 (0.661) -0.0094 (0.621) 0.5480
***
 (0.000) 0.152 
 260 days 0.0059 (0.561) -0.0045 (0.673) 0.6351
***
 (0.000) 0.572 
Ireland 20 days -0.0011 (0.925) 0.0147 (0.290) 0.6128
***
 (0.000) 0.282 
 260 days -0.0152 (0.283) 0.0178 (0.253) 0.6003
***
 (0.000) 0.317 
Italy 20 days 0.0023 (0.858) -0.0087 (0.543) 0.7007
***
 (0.000) 0.282 
 260 days 0.0075 (0.358) -0.0099 (0.261) 0.5365
***
 (0.000) 0.489 
Netherlands 20 days 0.0063 (0.598) 0.0046 (0.743) 0.6889
***
 (0.000) 0.226 
 260 days 0.0131
*
 (0.087) -0.0083 (0.323) 0.4338
***
 (0.000) 0.307 
U.K. 20 days -0.0044 (0.540) 0.0049 (0.553) 0.9706
***
 (0.000) 0.502 
 260 days -0.0009 (0.909) 0.0036 (0.677) 0.9216
***
 (0.000) 0.559 
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Table 8. Explanatory variables for cross-sectional tests 
 
The table presents explanatory variables used in regressions to explain cross-country differences in the performance of insider portfolios. MAD Supervisory Powers measures 
the existence of powers available to local authorities associated with the translation of 86 specific Market Abuse Directive rules into local laws (source: Christensen et al., 
2016). MAD Action Taken is a dummy equal to one if the authorities in a given country took at least one enforcement action against violation of MAD rules by 2009. It is 
equal to zero otherwise (source: Christensen et al., 2016). Closed Periods is a dummy variable equal to one if there are either closed periods in which insiders are not allowed 
to trade introduced at the country level or when firms are required to adopt closed periods at the firm level. The variable is equal to zero otherwise. Accelerated Trade 
Reporting is a dummy variable equal to one if the trade reporting deadline is shorter than five working days mandated by the E.U. directives, even for a subset of trades. The 
dummy is equal to zero otherwise. Both Closed Periods and Accelerated Trade Reporting are defined based on the information in Table 1. Ownership Concentration is the 
mean combined ownership stake of 3 largest shareholders across 10 largest publically listed firms in the country (source: LaPorta et al., 1998). Anti-Self-Dealing Index 
measures the protection of minority shareholders in the country against expropriation by management and controlling shareholders (source: Djankov et al., 2008). Equity 
Compensation is the mean ratio of equity-linked pay to total CEO pay in the country (source: Fernandes at al., 2013). Innovativeness is the gross domestic spending on 
Research and Development (R&D) as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (source: OECD). Religiosity is the percentage of survey respondents in the country 
who answered that religion is an important part of their daily life (source: Gallup). Trading Costs is the average percent effective spreads for all trades in a random sample of 
30 stocks per country (source: Fong et al., 2017). 
(continued) 
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Table 8. - continued 
 
Country 
MAD 
Supervisory 
Powers 
MAD Action 
Taken Closed Periods 
Accelerated 
Trade 
Reporting 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Anti-Self-
Dealing Index 
Equity 
Compensation Innovativeness Religiosity Trading Costs 
Belgium 69 0 0 0 0.54 0.54 0.088 0.021 0.33 0.012 
Czech Rep 64 0 0 0  0.33  0.014 0.21  
Denmark 60 0 1 1 0.45 0.46 0.192 0.029 0.19 0.015 
Estonia 60 1 1 0    0.017 0.16  
France 75 1 1 0 0.34 0.38 0.155 0.022 0.30 0.016 
Germany 64 1 0 0 0.48 0.28 0.098 0.027 0.40 0.020 
Greece 60 0 0 1 0.67 0.22  0.007 0.71 0.019 
Iceland 60 1 0 1  0.26  0.026   
Ireland 73 0 1 0 0.39 0.79 0.202 0.015 0.54 0.017 
Italy 70 1 0 0 0.58 0.42 0.115 0.012 0.72 0.007 
Latvia 80 1 0 1  0.32  0.006 0.39  
Lithuania 70 0 0 0  0.36   0.42  
Netherlands 67 1 1 1 0.39 0.20 0.203 0.018 0.33 0.013 
Norway 59 1 0 1 0.36 0.42 0.168 0.016 0.21 0.019 
Spain 60 0 0 1 0.51 0.37 0.009 0.013 0.49 0.007 
Sweden 73 1 1 0 0.28 0.33 0.015 0.033 0.17 0.016 
Switzerland   0 1 0.41 0.27 0.287 0.029 0.41 0.015 
U.K. 76 1 1 1 0.19 0.95 0.249 0.017 0.27 0.016 
Mean 67.06 0.59 0.39 0.50 0.43 0.41 0.148 0.019 0.37 0.015 
Median 67.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.41 0.36 0.162 0.017 0.33 0.016 
Std dev 6.78 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.13 0.20 0.086 0.008 0.17 0.004 
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Table 9. Determinants of portfolio performance 
 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the insider portfolio’s α in the country estimated in the 2008-2012 window. In Panel A of the table, the regressions include one 
explanatory variable of interest. In Panel B, the regressions include all explanatory variables which are significant at the 10% level or better for the given transaction type and 
holding horizon in one-variable regressions reported in Panel A. MAD Supervisory Powers measures the existence of powers available to local authorities associated with the 
translation of 86 specific Market Abuse Directive rules into local laws (source: Christensen et al., 2016). MAD Action Taken is a dummy equal to one if the authorities in a 
given country took at least one enforcement action against violation of MAD rules by 2009. It is equal to zero otherwise (source: Christensen et al., 2016). Closed Periods is a 
dummy variable equal to one if there are either closed periods in which insiders are not allowed to trade introduced at the country level or when firms are required to adopt 
closed periods at the firm level. The variable is equal to zero otherwise. Accelerated Trade Reporting is a dummy variable equal to one if the trade reporting deadline is 
shorter than five working days mandated by the E.U. directives, even for a subset of trades. The dummy is equal to zero otherwise. Both Closed Periods and Accelerated 
Trade Reporting are defined based on the information in Table 1. Ownership Concentration is the mean combined ownership stake of 3 largest shareholders across 10 largest 
publically listed firms in the country (source: LaPorta et al., 1998). Anti-Self-Dealing Index measures the protection of minority shareholders in the country against 
expropriation by management and controlling shareholders (source: Djankov et al., 2008). Equity Compensation is the mean ratio of equity-linked pay to total CEO pay in the 
country (source: Fernandes at al., 2013). Innovativeness is the gross domestic spending on Research and Development (R&D) as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) (source: OECD). Religiosity is the percentage of survey respondents in the country who answered that religion is an important part of their daily life (source: Gallup). 
Trading Costs is the average percent effective spreads for all trades in a random sample of 30 stocks per country (source: Fong et al., 2017). The constant is included in all 
regressions but not reported. p-values based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***
, 
**
 and 
*
 denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Purchases Sales 
 20 days 65 days 130 days 260 days 20 days 65 days 130 days 260 days 
Panel A. Regressions with one variable of interest 
MAD Supervisory Powers 0.0006 0.0006
*
 0.0003 0.0004 0.0006
*
 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006
*
 
 (0.353) (0.054) (0.327) (0.107) (0.089) (0.703) (0.719) (0.074) 
Adjusted R-sq 0.005 0.137 -0.016 0.104 0.100 -0.058 -0.059 0.230 
MAD Action Taken -0.0004 -0.0053 -0.0034 0.0028 -0.0043 -0.0014 0.0083 0.0093
**
 
 (0.954) (0.261) (0.480) (0.466) (0.428) (0.766) (0.190) (0.022) 
Adjusted R-sq -0.066 0.013 -0.031 -0.018 -0.017 -0.059 0.062 0.282 
Closed Periods 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0040 0.0021 0.0042 0.0019 0.0068 -0.0027 
 (1.000) (0.837) (0.404) (0.492) (0.421) (0.620) (0.287) (0.506) 
Adjusted R-sq -0.0623 -0.060 -0.013 -0.033 -0.017 -0.0489 0.026 -0.033 
(continued)
64 
 
Table 9. - continued 
 
 Purchases Sales 
 20 days 65 days 130 days 260 days 20 days 65 days 130 days 260 days 
Panel A. - continued 
Accelerated Trade Reporting -0.0006 -0.0035 -0.0101
**
 -0.0041 -0.0019 -0.0015 -0.0048 -0.0016 
 (0.930) (0.484) (0.017) (0.183) (0.711) (0.720) (0.408) (0.692) 
Adjusted R-sq -0.062 -0.030 -0.010 0.052 -0.053 -0.0534 -0.017 -0.052 
Ownership Concentration -0.0178 -0.0214 -0.0259
**
 -0.0301
*
 0.0014 0.0145 -0.0087 -0.0172 
 (0.664) (0.334) (0.031) (0.055) (0.939) (0.344) (0.675) (0.153) 
Adjusted R-sq -0.066 0.001 0.098 0.247 -0.0901 -0.035 -0.074 0.027 
Anti-Self-Dealing Index 0.0441
***
 0.0261
***
 0.0256
**
 0.0110 0.0137 0.0062 0.0127 0.0033 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.024) (0.341) (0.290) (0.442) (0.279) (0.660) 
Adjusted R-sq 0. 341 0.189 0.285 0.047 0.004 -0.045 0.011 -0.060 
Equity Compensation 0.0314 -0.0076 0.0031 0.0262 0.0355 0.0122 0.0252 0.0130 
 (0.598) (0.837) (0.912) (0.249) (0.193) (0.583) (0.280) (0.570) 
Adjusted R-sq -0.066 -0.095 -0.099 0.055 -0.029 -0.083 -0.026 -0.069 
Innovativeness -0.4681 -0.5048 -0.0838 0.1223 -0.0627 0.1322 -0.0323 -0.1930 
 (0.213) (0.125) (0.737) (0.639) (0.804) (0.592) (0.917) (0.599) 
Adjusted R-sq 0.000 0.087 -0.062 -0.044 -0.064 -0.047 -0.066 -0.030 
Religiosity 0.0200 -0.0130 -0.0246
**
 -0.0151 0.0156 0.0120 -0.0112 -0.0010 
 (0.359) (0.343) (0.024) (0.173) (0.350) (0.223) (0.568) (0.933) 
Adjusted R-sq -0.007 -0.014 0.178 0.095 0.004 -0.005 -0.040 -0.066 
Trading Costs 1.8971
***
 0.8961
*
 0.7608
*
 0.7146 -0.2873 -0.0711 -0.2613 0.1298 
 (0.001) (0.091) (0.069) (0.149) (0.733) (0.905) (0.674) (0.808) 
Adjusted R-sq 0.205 0.075 0.077 0.106 -0.079 -0.090 -0.075 -0.084 
(continued)
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Table 9. - continued 
 
 Purchases Sales 
 20 days 65 days 130 days 260 days 20 days 65 days 130 days 260 days 
Panel B. Regressions with multiple variables of interest 
MAD Supervisory Powers  -0.0002      0.0005
*
 
  (0.541)      (0.086) 
MAD Action Taken        0.0076
**
 
        (0.025) 
Accelerated Trade Reporting   -0.0059
***
      
   (0.010)      
Ownership Concentration   0.0233
*
      
   (0.059)      
Anti-Self-Dealing Index 0.0398
***
 0.0310
***
 0.0298
***
      
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)      
Religiosity   -0.0197
**
      
   (0.030)      
Trading Costs 1.8761
***
 0.8765
*
 0.7025
**
      
 (0.005) (0.066) (0.028)      
Adjusted R-sq 0.529 0.548 0.852     0.414 
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Figure 1. α’s of insider portfolios over time 
 
The figure presents Jensen’s α’s (middle line) of insider portfolios and their 95% confidence intervals estimated 
in rolling windows of 60 months. α's are estimated from the CAPM model presented in equation (1). The 
portfolios consist of all shares purchased or sold by insiders in a given country in open market transactions and 
held for 20 trading days. Dates on the horizontal axis indicate the last date of the respective rolling window. 
Details of the sample are presented in Table 2. 
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Figure 1. - continued 
 
Panel C. Italy  
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Panel D. Netherlands  
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